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THE DAWSON REPORT AND 
MERGER REGULATION 
 
JULIE CLARKE*
I INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Review of the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act ('the 
Dawson Report')1 was released by the Federal Government in April 2003.  In the 
first substantial chapter of the Report, the Dawson Committee ('the Committee')2 
made a number of recommendations in relation to the merger prohibitions and 
procedures.  Briefly, while recommending the retention of the current substantial 
lessening of competition test, the Committee made a number of significant recom-
mendations for change regarding the procedures to be applied in assessing potential 
mergers.  These recommendations have received the support of the Government, 
though no bill has yet been released for consideration by Parliament.  This paper 
will discuss the recommendations of the Committee in light of the submissions it 
received.3
                                                          
*  Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University; PhD Candidate, Queensland University of Technology. 
 
1  Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Review of the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act (Commonwealth of Australia, report dated 31 January 2003, released 16 April 2003) 
(‘Dawson Report’) 
2  The Committee comprised Sir Daryl Dawson AC KBE CB (Chairman), Ms Jillian Segal and Mr Curt 
Rendall. 
3  The submissions reviewed consist of the written public submissions made available on the Dawson 
Review’s internet website <http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/home.asp>.  The author is not aware 
of the contents of any of the confidential submissions (of which there were 14), informal representations 
(of which the Committee indicates there were 320) or of any oral submissions made through consulta-
tions.  These are mentioned on page 3 of the Dawson Report but no meaningful details are provided 
regarding those consultations. 
 It will also consider Government, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and other responses to the Review and speculate as to the 
likelihood and desirability of any or all of the recommendations being implemented. 
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II EXISTING MERGER LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (‘TPA’) prohibits mergers that would, or would be 
likely to, substantially lessen competition in a market.4   A market, for the purpose 
of this assessment, is defined as a substantial market for goods or services in Aus-
tralia, a State, a Territory or a region of Australia.5  In determining whether a pro-
posed merger will, or will be likely to, substantially lessen competition, a number of 
factors must be considered, including actual and potential imports, barriers to entry, 
the level of concentration in the market, vertical integration and the availability of 
substitutes.6  The ACCC’s Merger Guidelines,7 which do not have any legislative 
force, provide parties to a proposed merger with further guidance as to how the 
Commission will analyse a proposed merger to determine if it contravenes s 50.8
There is no statutory notification regime in Australia requiring parties to seek ap-
proval before merging.
    
9  However, parties can, and frequently do, notify the ACCC 
in advance of a proposed merger to obtain an opinion about its legality.10
                                                          
4  TPA s 50(6).   
5  Ibid. 
6  TPA s 50(3):  Other factors that must be taken into account include ‘the degree of countervailing power 
in the market’, ‘the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able to significantly 
and sustainably increase prices or profit margins’, ‘the dynamic characteristics of the market, including 
growth, innovation and product differentiation’ and ‘the likelihood that the acquisition would result in 
the removal from the market of a vigorous and effective competitor.  Other factors may also be taken into 
account. 
7  ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, June 1991.   
8  ACCC, above n 7, 29:   First, the ACCC will identify the relevant market.  The  ACCC will normally 
only be concerned about a merger if it leads to the four largest firms holding 75 per cent or more of the 
market share, with the merged form to supply at least 15 per cent of the market, or if the merged firm 
will supply 40 per cent or more of the market (above n 7, 28 (para 5.27)).  See also Julie Brebner, ‘The 
Relevance of Import Competition to Merger Assessment in Australia’ (2002) 10 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 119.  Parties may also be assisted by information contained in the ACCC’s 
annual reports and may be guided by information about recent mergers that is made publicly available on 
the ACCC’s Merger Public Register  
(ACCC, Mergers Public Register <http://www.accc.gov.au/ >)  
9  Most jurisdictions that regulate mergers have a compulsory notification regime.  Approximately 51 
countries require pre-notification of mergers, 12 have compulsory post-notification requirements and 
Australia is one of 9 with a voluntary scheme of notification (for more detail see International Competi-
tion Network, ‘International Merger Law Database – Summer 2002’, Compiled by the International Bar 
Association <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/new_merger_control_appendix-icn_ 
jurisdictions2.pdf>).  In 1992 the Cooney Committee recommended a mandatory pre-notification scheme 
be introduced in Australia, but the recommendation never came to fruition (Senate Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Mergers, Monopolies and Acquisitions: Adequacy of Existing 
Legislative Controls, (Commonwealth of Australia, 1991) recommendations 5&6, xiv; 55-76 (the 
‘Cooney Report’)).  No public submission to the Dawson Committee called for a mandatory notification 
(save in limited cases of market concentration or creeping acquisitions, discussed below) and many 
specifically noted their opposition to the introduction of any such mandatory system.  See also Law 
Council of Australia, Supplementary Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 196, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 14-17. 
   After 
10  See Stephen Corones, ‘The Strategic Approach to Merger Enforcement by the ACCC’ (1998) 26 
Australian Business Law Review 64, 67; ACCC, The ACCC's Approach to Mergers: A statistical sum-
mary (1998),  27; SFE Corporation Limited, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 92, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 11; Australia 
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receiving such notification the ACCC may grant an informal clearance, refuse 
clearance, or grant clearance to the parties subject to them accepting enforceable 
undertakings designed to alleviate the anti-competitive concerns held by the Com-
mission.11  The ACCC is not required to provide reasons for its decision, but it does 
publish an informal mergers register which contains limited information about why 
clearance is (or is not) granted. The time taken for an opinion from the ACCC 
varies depending on the complexity of the merger.12  Statistically, about four to five 
per cent of mergers notified to the ACCC raise competition concerns.13  For those 
that do not, a grant of informal clearance means the parties can proceed with confi-
dence that the merger will not be challenged.  However, as the clearance has no 
force in law, there is nothing to prevent the ACCC subsequently opposing the 
merger.14
                                                                                                                                       
and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provi-
sions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 91, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 4. 
11  These undertakings are legally binding and, if breached, the ACCC may enforce them in the courts.  
Parties have shown a general willingness to provide the undertakings requested by the Commission, with 
almost 50% of all mergers opposed between mid-1993 and mid-2001 being resolved in this way: be-
tween 1 July 1993 and 30 June 2001, of the 87 mergers opposed, 42 (just over 48%) were resolved by 
way of undertakings given by the parties: (see ACCC, ACCC Annual Report (2000-2001)). This figure 
appears to be rising.  In the 2000-2001 financial year, of 13 mergers opposed, 10 were resolved by way 
of enforceable undertakings. 
12  ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, above n 7, 17.  A number of submissions to the Dawson Review dis-
cussed the time and procedures associated with informal clearance: see, for example:  SFE Corporation, 
above n 10, 5 & 9; International Banks and Securities Association of Australia (IBSA), Submission to the 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 93, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 7 (claims ACCC regularly exceeds the time frames it sets for itself); United 
Energy, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public 
Submission 25, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 7 (explains the current process in detail).  For a more 
detailed history of the clearance process in Australia see Law Council of Australia, above n 9, 13-14. 
13  Dawson Report, above n 1, 46.  See also ACCC, Exports and the Trade Practices Act: Guideline to 
the Commission's approach to mergers, acquisitions and other collaborative arrangements that aim to 
enhance exports and the international competitiveness of Australian industry (October 1997) 6 and 
Brebner, above n 8, 127-129.  Big business (in particular) has observed that these statistics will not 
include mergers not notified (or notified but abandoned prior to a decision by the ACCC) because the 
parties, while believing that their conduct will not substantially lessen competition, abandon the merger 
rather than risk an adverse informal finding by the ACCC, nor will they include proposed mergers so 
likely to substantially lessen competition that the parties abandon the proposal. In this respect, former 
ACCC Chairman, Prof Allan Fels has doubted whether there are any, or at least many, such cases 
(‘Frankly, I do not regard Australian CEOs as shrinking violets afraid to sound out the regulator about 
possible mergers’: Allan Fels, ‘Persistent myths ignore the reality of ACCC action’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 21 November 2002).  In any event, it should also be observed that these statistics also 
will not include mergers so unlikely to substantially lessen competition that they are not notified to the 
ACCC for clearance – one might expect this figure to compensate for any mergers not notified for fear of 
ACCC opposition. 
14  See, for example, TPC v Santos Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 382 where the ACCC initially indicated it would 
not object to a proposal but subsequently brought an action for an injunction to prevent the merger 
proceeding, having formed the view it was likely to create a position of dominance. 
  In practice, this is likely to happen only if relevant information was not 
disclosed to the ACCC or aspects of the merger have changed since notification. 
More importantly, however, informal clearance does not guarantee freedom from 
prosecution by third parties who, while not able to seek an injunction to prevent a 
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merger proceeding,15
For proposed mergers that raise competition concerns, which cannot be alleviated 
by the provision of enforceable undertakings, a refusal of clearance from the ACCC 
leaves the parties with two options.  First, they may proceed and risk almost inevi-
table challenge by the ACCC which, if successful, is likely to  result in an injunc-
tion, if obtained prior to merger, or divestiture, subsequent to merger, as well as 
pecuniary penalties of up to $10 million.
 may nevertheless challenge a merger that has proceeded and 
obtain declaratory relief, orders for divestiture or damages. 
16  Alternatively, parties may seek authori-
sation which will only be granted if the merging parties can demonstrate a public 
benefit such that the merger ought to be allowed to proceed.17  In this respect, the 
term 'public benefit' is to be given its widest possible meaning.18  For guidance, the 
ACCC merger guidelines list numerous factors that could constitute public benefits, 
including development of import replacements, more efficient allocation of re-
sources and improved quality and safety.19   A grant (or refusal) of authorisation 
may be reviewed by the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) on applica-
tion of any party with 'sufficient interest' in the determination.20
                                                          
15  Section 80(1) of the TPA permits the court to award an injunction in ‘such terms as the court deems 
appropriate’ for breaches of, inter alia, s 50 of the TPA.  However, s 80(1A) provides that a person ‘other 
than the Commission is not entitled to make an application under subsection (1) for an injunction [in 
relation to] section 50 …’.     
16  TPA s 76(1A)(b).  A 'person' (other than a corporation) involved in a contravention will also be liable 
to pay pecuniary penalties of up to $500,000: TPA  s 76(1B). 
17  Section 88(9) gives the commission the power to grant such authorizations.  Section 90(9) provides 
that the ACCC shall not grant an authorisation in relation to proposed mergers ‘unless it is satisfied in all 
the circumstances that the proposed acquisition would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to 
the public that the acquisition should be allowed to take place.’  See further Maureen Brunt, ‘The Use of 
Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation: Australia’ (1986) 14 Australian Business Law Review 261, 
265. 
18  Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd & Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) ATPR 40-012 , 
17,242 (QCMA) (‘… we would not wish to rule out of consideration any argument coming within the 
widest possible conception of public benefit. …’). 
19  See further, ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, above n 7, 68-69 (para 6.38).  In determining what amounts 
to such a benefit, s 90(9A) TPA requires the Commission to have regard to, amongst other things ‘a 
significant increase in the real value of exports’, '‘a significant substitution of domestic products for 
imported goods’ and ‘all other relevant matters that relate to the international competitiveness of any 
Australian industry’. 
20  TPA s 101(1). 
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III BACKGROUND AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
DAWSON COMMITTEE 
A Background 
On 15 October 2001, the Prime Minister announced that there would be an inde-
pendent review of the competition provisions of the TPA.21  The Committee, con-
sisting of Sir Daryl Dawson (Chair), Mr Curt Rendall and Ms Jillian Segal,22 was 
appointed in May 2002 and given until 30 November 2002 to Report.23
(f) are flexible and responsive to the transitional needs of industries undergoing 
or communities affected by, structural and/or regulatory change and to the re-
quirements of rural and regional areas.
  The terms 
of reference included reviewing Part IV of the TPA to determine whether the provi-
sions therein: 
(a) inappropriately impede the ability of Australian industry to compete locally 
and internationally;  
(b) provide an appropriate balance of power between competing business, and in 
particular businesses competing with or dealing with businesses that have lar-
ger market concentration or power; 
(c) promote competitive trading which benefits consumers in terms of services 
and price; 
(e)  allow businesses to readily exercise their rights and obligations under the Act, 
consistent with certainty, transparency and accountability, and use compliance 
or authorisation processes applicable to their circumstances; and 
24
The terms of reference then required the Committee to identify any justifiable 
improvements to the TPA and its administration ‘to achieve a more efficient, fair, 
timely and accessible framework for competition law.’
 
 
25
                                                          
21 Prime Minister, ‘Securing Australia’s Prosperity’ (Press Release, 15 October 2001) 
<http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/2001/media_release1338.htm>. 
22  Sir Daryl Dawson AC KBE CB is a former High Court Justice and former Solicitor-General of 
Victoria.  Ms Jillian Segal is a former corporate lawyer, Deputy Chair of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) and Commissioner of ASIC.  Mr Curt Rendall is the Chairman of the 
Commonwealth Government’s Small Business Consultative Committee.  It has been observed that 
‘[l]ittle is known about the group that will decide the future of competition law in Australia’: ‘Regula-
tion: The Rule Changers’, Business Review Weekly, 24(43), 31 October 2002 
<http://brw.com.au/Stories/20021031/16743.aspx>. 
23  Treasurer, ‘Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (Press Release No 
23, 9 May 2002) <http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressrelease/2002/023.asp>.  The initial 
reporting date was announced as August 2002: Prime Minister, above n 21. 
24  Ibid, 23.   
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This was the first comprehensive public review of the TPA since the National 
Competition Review which reported on 25 August 1993.26  The Committee’s Report 
was submitted to the Treasurer on 31 January 200327
B Key Recommendations 
 and released to the public, 
together with a government response, on 16 April 2003.   
The Dawson Committee reached a number of conclusions and made a number of 
recommendations in relation to the existing merger regime.  Key among them were 
that:  
• the current substantive test should remain unchanged;  
• reasons should be provided in some cases where the ACCC considers a re-
quest for informal clearance;  
• an optional formal clearance procedure should be established; and  
• merger authorisation requests should be made directly to the Australian 
Competition Tribunal and not the ACCC. 
 
Each of these conclusions and recommendations, together with the submissions 
made to the Committee on each issue, will be considered in the following section. 
IV SUBMISSIONS TO THE DAWSON COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE 
A Retention of the substantial lessening of                               
competition test 
A significant number of submissions addressed the substantive merger test, with 
many calling for the merger test to be repealed or modified in some way.  The key 
submissions argued that:28
                                                                                                                                       
25  Term of Reference 2: Treasurer, above n 23.  
26  Independent Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy (Commonwealth of Australia, 1993) 
(‘Hilmer Report’). 
27  The original reporting date of 30 November was extended to 31 January 2003: TPA Review, ‘Report 
of the Review of the Trade Practices Act’ (Press Release, 12 November 2002) 
<http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/pr_121102.asp>. 
 
28  Other submissions included that it should be repealed completely (Ron Gilbert, Submission to the 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 2, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 9: ‘… the most important change to be made to Part IV is the repeal of 
section 50 – or, if it is not repealed, at least amended to apply only to mergers that would involve the 
creation of a monopoly …’); the test should become simply ‘is the merger anti-competitive?’ (Robin 
Speed, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public 
Submission 36, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 1); that the test should allow a merger ‘if there would 
still be effective competition in the market following the acquisition, even if the acquisition itself would 
affect the degree of competition in that market’ (Commonwealth Bank, Submission to the Review of the 
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• the existing substantial lessening of competition test be retained; 
• the existing test be replaced with a market dominance test; 
• an ‘efficiency defence’ be introduced; 
• a ‘public benefit defence’ be introduced; and 
• that a test be introduced to capture ‘creeping’ acquisitions. 
 
1 Substantial lessening of competition versus dominance 
Several submissions called for a return to the market dominance test which applied 
in Australia from 1977-1993.29  This would have the effect of enabling a merger to 
proceed, even if it substantially lessened competition in an Australian market, 
provided it would not result in the merged firm being in a position to control or 
dominate the relevant market.  Thus, proponents of a return to the dominance test 
were pushing for a weaker test (in the sense that it would permit more mergers to 
proceed)30
It is not surprising that this issue was the focus of a number of submissions as, 
historically, this has been the key debate in relation to the substantive merger test in 
Australia.
 than the existing one.   
31  Traditionally, big business has argued for a dominance test32
                                                                                                                                       
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 96, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 6); and that the test should simply be ‘two firms having a constraining degree of market 
power may exist in any market where there is ease of entry and expansion or potential import competi-
tion’ (Energex, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Public Submission 46, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2-3).  
29  United Energy, above n 12, 3; Duke Energy Australia Pty Ltd, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 26, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 2-3:  Warren Pengilley, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 8, Trade Practices Act Review 2002; Alan Morgan & Jim 
Hoggett (Institute of Public Affairs Ltd), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 18, Trade Practices Act Review 2002; Australian Industry 
Group, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public 
Submission 109, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 48 (noting that it did not ‘demand’ reversion do 
dominance but that it ‘might be argued that the dominance test is a more appropriate test for a market 
and markets as small as those in Australia’).   
30  See Victorian Government, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, ‘A Competitive and Fair Marketplace’, Public Submission 148, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 12 (the problem with dominance test is ‘… highlighted by the acquisition by Amcor and 
Visy Board of 50 per cent each of the only remaining Australian corrugated fibreboard manufacturer … 
The acquisition did not lead to dominance … but it did substantially lessen competition.’)  Compare SFE 
Corporation, above n 10, 10 (‘… doubts whether a change from the substantial lessening of competition 
to the dominance test would make any discernible difference to the likely outcome …’) and Pengilley, 
above n 29 (‘My guess is that an analysis of company mergers since the introduction of the “substantial 
lessening of competition” test would show that most of those disallowed would also come within the 
previous dominance test …’).   
 while 
31  When the TPA was first introduced in 1974 it prohibited mergers which substantially lessened 
competition.  Criticism of this test led the legislature to replace it with a dominance test in 1977.  Under 
this test, mergers that created or substantially strengthened a position of ‘control or dominance’ in a 
‘substantial’ market were prohibited.  In 1986 this test was amended to prohibit acquisitions if they 
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small business and consumers have advocated the substantial lessening of competi-
tion test.  This has also been one of the key debates internationally, with most 
jurisdictions adopting one or other of these tests.33
• it would facilitate the creation of ‘national champions’ or otherwise better 
enable Australian companies to compete effectively in the global market-
place;
 
In submissions to the Review, a number of reasons were advanced to justify a return 
to the dominance test, including that: 
34
• it would lead to greater certainty;
 
35
• it would involve less of a waste of resources;
 
36
• it would not obstruct mergers unnecessarily, as it was argued the current 
test does.
 and 
37
                                                                                                                                       
would result in the corporation being, or being likely to be ‘in a position to dominate a market for goods 
or services’ or mergers that would ‘substantially strengthen’ an existing position of dominance.  In 1989 
the Griffiths Committee recommended against changing back to a substantial lessening of competition 
test (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Mergers, 
Takeovers and Monopolies: Profiting from Competition (Commonwealth of Australia, May 1989) 63, 
recommendation 63 (‘Griffiths Report’)).  There was, however, some support for a return to the substan-
tial lessening of competition test during this inquiry: see, for example, Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Mergers, takeovers and monopolies (sub-committee workshop, 24 October 1988)  
22 (Philip Clarke): ‘I am of the opinion that section 50 is currently too tolerant of mergers. … the 
dominance test would … allow mergers which would result in there being a substantial lessening of 
competition.  I would advocate that a harsher test be applied …’).  In 1992 the Cooney Committee 
recommended a return to the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test, which was accepted by the 
government and re-introduced into the Act in 1993 (Cooney Report, above n 9, chapter 3).  See also 
Warren Pengilley, ‘The Ten Most Disastrous Decisions Made Relating to the Trade Practices Act’ 
(2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 331, 349-352. 
32  See also Allan Fels, ‘Mergers and Market Power’ (Speech delivered at the Australia-Israel Chamber 
of Commerce Boardroom Lunch, Sydney, 15 March 2001)  
<http://www.accc.gov.au/speeches/2001/fels_Israel_15_3_01.htm>: ‘… the big business’s agenda over 
the years has been to weaken and water down the merger law at every opportunity.  Some CEOs want a 
soft merger law others want no law even if this means an economy made up of monopolies that cannot 
compete internationally.’ 
33  The substantial lessening of competition test (or restriction on competition test) has been adopted in a 
number of countries, including the United States (Clayton Act, s 7), Canada, New Zealand (which, until 
2001, applied a dominance test), France, Ireland, South Africa and the United Kingdom (Enterprise Act 
2002, Part 3).   On the other hand, a dominance test applies in the European Union (Council Regulation 
4064 of 1989; this test also applies in a number of the EU Member States; for example, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands) and in a number of other States, 
including Switzerland, Hungary, Poland and Norway. Note, however, that in relation to a number of 
these countries additional tests relating to public benefits or efficiencies may also apply. 
34  Only this reason attracted a significant number of submissions.  They are discussed in detail, below. 
35  Pengilley, above n 29 (‘The non-prohibition of those few mergers which might not be caught by a 
“dominance” test but would be caught by the lower “substantial lessening of competition test” can be 
justified by the greater certainty of, and smoother overall operation of, s.50 which a dominance test 
would bring.’); Duke Energy, above n 29, 2-3. 
36  United Energy, above n 12, 3. 
37  Duke Energy, above n 29, 2-3. 
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It was also argued that, because tests focussing on market conduct rather than 
structure are to be preferred, where structural prohibitions exist they should not be 
overly burdensome.38
The first of these arguments (that Australian firms needed to be permitted to reach a 
certain scale, or ‘critical mass’ to successfully compete in global markets) received 
the most attention in submissions to the Dawson Committee.  The claim was ad-
vanced that the current test inhibits Australian business from being competitive 
internationally.
 
39
                                                          
38  See, for example, Optus, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 17, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 5 (‘Conduct based regula-
tion is superior to market structure regulation … a useable and effective s.46 test is preferred to an overly 
restrictive s.50 test. … ‘); Gilbert, above n 28.  Compare Telstra, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 117, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 90 (Quoting with approval the World Bank and OECD: “The rationale for merger control 
is simple: it is far better to prevent firms from gaining market power than to attempt to control market 
power once it exists.” (World Bank & OECD A Framework for the Design and Implementation of 
Competition Law and Policy (1998) 41)).  See also Fels, above n 32 (‘… once industry structures are in 
place, they are difficult to alter …’). 
39  Duke Energy, above n 29, 2-3 (‘… the current test inhibits firms from gaining the critical mass 
necessary to compete globally …’); BP Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provi-
sions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 47, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 1 (‘… 
amendments to s.50 are required to improve the competitiveness of Australian business internationally’);  
Gilbert, above n 28; Optus, above n 38, 5 (‘The current merger test prevents Australian companies from 
attaining a critical mass that enables them to compete on an international scale. … being strong at home 
provides companies with strength abroad’); ExxonMobil, Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 50, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 6 
(‘…there may be circumstances where a corporation needs to be able to merge with a competitor, either 
to gain a critical mass in the domestic market in order to expand into overseas markets, or to effectively 
compete against other local manufacturers or importers.’); SFE Corporation, above n 10, 6-7 (‘There is a 
… growing imperative for Australian companies to achieve the scale and efficiencies necessary to 
compete internationally. …); Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 7 (‘ … Australian enterprises need to be 
able to grow in size and resources to compete successfully in foreign markets.’); CSR Limited, Submis-
sion to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 97, 
Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2 (‘… Given the size of the Australian economy relative to the more 
populous economies, the level of market concentration needs to be higher in order to realise economies 
of scale and efficiency. …’); Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 48 (‘… there is a perception that the 
mergers rules impede companies in Australia from globalising or becoming of sufficient size and mass as 
to be internationally competitive. …); UBS Warburg Australia Ltd, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 127, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 5 (‘… significant consideration needs to be given to the ability of Australian companies to 
obtain the economies of scale necessary to compete internationally …’); International Chamber of 
Commerce Australia (ICC), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 143, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 23 (‘It would seem fairly 
common sense that in a small economy such as Australia’s, mergers ought to be permitted according to 
market forces – even to the extent of allowing monopolization to occur.  Apart from anything else, such 
mergers may well be necessary to achieve economies of scale, and facilitate greater competitiveness on 
the international market.’)  Not all of these submissions called for a return to the dominance test: see, for 
example, the Business Council of Australia, which did not call for a reversion to the dominance test but 
claimed that ‘… the TPA and its administration be reformed … to allow Australian companies to achieve 
the scale and efficiencies necessary to compete both internationally and against international competitors 
in the domestic market’ (Business Council of Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, ‘Towards Prosperity’, Public Submission 71, Trade Prac-
tices Act Review 2002, 12). 
  This, it was said, was particularly acute given Australia’s small 
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size.40  Along this line it was also argued that failure to loosen merger laws would 
result in Australia becoming a branch economy.41
In response, numerous other submissions argued for the retention of the substantial 
lessening of competition test.
  It was argued, primarily by 
business groups, that to avoid these problems firms ought to be able to merge to 
achieve economies of scale ‘necessary’ for the global market, even if this resulted 
in a substantial lessening of competition.   
42
                                                          
40  See, for example, Michal Gal, ‘Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition 
Policy’ (2001) 74 University of Southern California Law Review 1437, 1476 (‘… the size of an economy 
significantly affects its optimal competition policy. … [there is a] greater need to recognize the inevita-
bility of concentrated market structures protected by high entry barriers in many industries in small 
economies.’)  Compare comments by Prof Allan Fels, claiming that there is a ‘risk that national champi-
ons could become indolent monopolies charging high prices to consumers to subsidise overseas expan-
sion’: Fels, above n 13. 
41  CSR Limited, above n 39, 2 (‘  … CSR remains concerned about Australia becoming a branch 
economy …’).  Compare AAMI, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 69, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2 (‘The prospect of large 
international corporations buying large (in the Australian market) public companies and converting them 
to “branch office operations” is … over-stated’); Productivity Commission, Submission to the Review of 
the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 125, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 47 (‘… in our recent survey of Australian offshore investment … mergers regulation is not 
identified as a major influence on firms’ decisions to locate offshore. …’) and Victorian Government, 
above n 30, 13 (‘… there seems to be little evidence that companies have been forced overseas because 
their merger proposals have  not succeeded.  …’).  See also Fels, above n 13 (‘there are many reasons 
why companies move offshore and merger law ranks low on the list’) and Brett Clegg & Annabel 
Hepworth, ‘ACCC not to blame for knocking our champions’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 19 
September 2002 <http:/afr.com/specialreports/report1/2002/09/19/FFXQC2DP66D.html> (‘[t]here are 
many factors that have held back Australian companies from making a success of it overseas – often it 
just comes down to simply bad management decisions. …’ (quoting Ron Malek, of the Caliburn Partner-
ship)). 
  In respect of the national champions argument, it 
42  See, for example, Independent Paper Group, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 21, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 3 (‘… the 
current provisions provide a proper balance of power between small and large businesses …’); Queen-
sland Retail Traders & Shopkeepers Association (QRTSA), Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 58, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 7 
(…strongly supports the present role of the ACCC in merger cases’); ACCC, Submission to the Review 
of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 56, Trade Practices 
Act Review 2002, 134; Civil Contractors Federation, Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 68, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2 
(‘… the current merger law works well …’); Small Business Development Corporation (WA), Submis-
sion to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 84, 
Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 4 (‘… opposed to any relaxation of current merger laws, particularly a 
return to the ‘market dominance’ test which would make the legislation ineffective’); ANZ, above n 10, 
1 (‘ANZ supports the current ‘substantial lessening of competition test’ for mergers …’); SFE Corpora-
tion, above n 10, 1 (‘there is insufficient basis for changing the “substantial lessening of competition” 
test in section 50 of the TPA’); Fair Trading Coalition (A Coalition of Small Business for Trade Prac-
tices Act Reform), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
1974, Public Submission 98, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, iii & 33 (‘The current mergers test … 
should not be changed’); Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), Submission to the 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 104, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 13 & 97; Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA), Submission to the Review 
of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 118, Trade Practices 
Act Review 2002, 1; Julie Brebner, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 123, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2; Peter Armitage, 
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was submitted that there is no evidence that scale is necessary to compete effec-
tively in global markets.43  Rather, it was claimed, international competitiveness is 
best achieved by the existence of fiercely competitive domestic rivals.44
                                                                                                                                       
Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submis-
sion 128, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 1; Senator R Boswell, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 129, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 17; The Pharmacy Guild of Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 131, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 
1; Spier Consulting Pty Ltd, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 133, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 4 & 20; Business Law 
Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 138, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2; Victorian 
Government, above n 30, 3;  AAPT Limited, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 160, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 14. 
   
43 AAMI, above n 41, 2 (‘… the “international scale” argument is over-stated. …’); ACCC, above n 42, 
16 (‘ … there is no compelling evidence to support claims that the current mergers law is stifling Austra-
lia’s international competitiveness or that it is unsuitable in an era of globalisation. … [142] The Austral-
ian business community is far from unanimous in its support for the creation of national champions…. a 
number of academic studies have arrived at an entirely different conclusion on the desirability of national 
champions as compared to big business … [143] … no empirical evidence exists to support the national 
champions thesis. …’); W Robert McComas, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 75, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 12 (‘Whether 
section 50 in its present form really inhibits the opportunity for Australian business to compete on global 
markets is at large, and, in the writer’s opinion, not made out.  Protagonists of that argument are few, 
albeit vocal, but to date, it is difficult to identify any empirical evidence of its validity’); State Chamber 
of Commerce (NSW), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974, Public Submission 79, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 3 (‘We believe the “national cham-
pions” argument, often used by parties in favour of relaxing merger law, is invalid. … [4] … there is no 
empirical evidence to support the national champions view that there is a net benefit to the country if 
domestic competition is sacrificed so that big corporations can be internationally competitive’); Fair 
Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35 (‘There is … considerable doubt that the so called benefits or larger 
scale actually eventuate. …  domestic monopoly [may] in no way [assist] in the international market’); 
Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (CCAAC), Submission to the Review of the Compe-
tition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 111, Trade Practices Act Review 
2002, 4 (‘… There is simply no evidence to support this indeed, the evidence is to the contrary’); 
Australian Business Limited, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 112, Trade Practices Act Review  2002, 4 (claimed results of a 
survey it conducted among manufacturers were ‘clear with strong opposition to big business mergers to 
create “national champions”’); Productivity Commission, above n 41, 47 (‘not aware of any empirical 
evidence that suggests that domestic size is closely related to export performance or propensity.’); 
Boswell, above n 42, 17 (there are ‘many examples of global expansion by Australian companies 
demonstrating that the present test does not prevent the global entry of industries’); Spier Consulting, 
above n 42, 12 (the Act ‘does not inappropriately impede the ability of Australian Industry to compete 
locally and internationally … it has remained remarkably flexible in the fact of dramatic changes to the 
Australian market and the global environment.  Those who say otherwise often do so out of self-interest 
… [22] … [t]here is … considerable doubt that the so-called benefits of large scale entities actually 
eventuates. …’); Independent Petroleum Marketers Association Australia, Submission to the Review of 
the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 134, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 13; Victorian Government, above n, 13 (‘… Victoria’s view is that business size is not a 
prerequisite to export success: … ‘); Communications Law Centre, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 177, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 1.  See also Clegg & Hepworth, above n 41 (quoting Ron Malek of the Caliburn Patner-
ship: ‘I think it is too simplistic to say that competition regulation stifles Australian companies from 
building global businesses … In some industries, scale is much more important than others’ and Free-
 
 50   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 8 NO 2 
 
This position has been most vigorously championed by Professor Michael Porter45 
who has conducted empirical research on what gives business competitive advan-
tage in the age of globalisation.  Professor Porter’s research led him to conclude that 
nations with ‘leading world positions often have a number of strong local rivals’.46
Among the strongest empirical findings from our research is the association be-
tween vigorous domestic rivalry and the creation and persistence of competitive 
advantage in an industry. … In global competition, successful firms compete vig-
orously at home and pressure each other to improve and innovate. … We found, in 
contrast, few “national champions,” or firms with virtually unrivalled domestic po-
sitions, that were internationally competitive. (footnotes omitted)
   
In his seminal work, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter claims: 
47
Vigorous local competition not only sharpens advantages at home but pressures 
domestic firms to sell abroad in order to grow. … With little domestic rivalry, 
firms are more content to rely on the home market.  Toughened by domestic ri-
valry, the stronger domestic firms are equipped to succeed abroad.  It is rare that a 
 
                                                                                                                                       
hills’ Donald Robertson: there is ‘a growing realisation, if not acceptance, that the so-called national 
champions argument is a deeply flawed argument.’) 
44  G Masterman, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
1974, Public Submission 6, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 1 (‘The argument that Australian compa-
nies in order to compete internationally need increases in size through mergers having the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in their domestic market is fallacious.  Strong competition in the 
domestic market primes a company for entry into foreign markets.   Many examples could be given, 
…’); ACCC, above n 42, 16 (‘… a weak or compromised mergers policy could actually undermine 
Australia’s international competitiveness’); CCAAC, above n 42, 3 (‘the best way to ensure Australian 
companies can compete effectively is to have a competitive and effective market that drives the building 
of genuine competitive advantage’); Brebner, above n 42, 3 (vigorous domestic competitors ‘create firms 
that are better able to compete internationally’); Victorian Government, above n 30, 13 (‘It is strong 
domestic competition that ultimately creates the ‘national champions’.  Big businesses benefit from 
strong domestic competition, which lowers costs and enables them to compete internationally. … ‘); 
Canberra Consumers, above n 44, 1 (‘… Global success can only be achieved in a marketplace which is 
responsive to customer desires and competition … reduced competition … [results in] companies 
[becoming] complacent and uncompetitive.’); Queensland Government, Submission to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 198, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 7 (‘… the basis for the international competitiveness of Australian firms is their success in 
a vigorously competitive domestic market’).   
45 The ACCC in its submission relied heavily on the research of Michael Porter: see ACCC, above n 42, 
142 (‘Porter found a strong empirical link between vigorous domestic rivalry and the creation and 
persistence of competitive advantage in an industry’), at 143 (‘Porter and Sakakibara concluded that their 
examination provided robust evidence that domestic rivalry is positively associated with international 
trade performance. [from Sakariko, M. & Porter, M.E., ‘Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence 
from Japanese Industry’, Fundamental Theory Task Force Report, American Bar Association 2001]’) 
and at 143 (‘.... Unless a firm is forced to compete at home, it will quickly lose its competitiveness 
abroad. [fn 181: Professor Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-Based 
Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures, Fundamental Theory Task Force Report, American 
Bar Association, 2001]’).   
46  Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 117.   
47  Ibid.   
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company can meet tough foreign rivals when it has faced no significant competi-
tion at home. …’ (footnotes omitted) 48
In this respect, a number of submissions highlighted the fact that there have been 
many small-to-medium sized Australian businesses that have been successful in the 
global market
 
49 and that, given Australia’s relatively small economy, even if the 
scale argument did have merit, a domestic firm allowed monopoly status would still 
not be large enough to compete with firms from larger economies.50
• Australian consumers should not be disadvantaged by large firms wanting 
to compete internationally
 
Other reasons advanced in submissions for retention of the substantial lessening of 
competition test included that:  
51
                                                          
48  Ibid 119.   
49  A number of submissions highlighted the success of many small Australian firms in the global 
market: see, for example, AAMI, above n 41, 2 (‘[m]any relatively small Australian companies success-
fully compete both domestically and internationally with other companies big and small.  On the other 
hand, there have been monopolies, duopolies – operations with “scale” – where the businesses and 
consumers they supply and service have been disadvantaged in terms of pricing, responsiveness and 
outmoded products and services.’); McComas, above n 43, 10 (‘… it be said that, to the extent that 
particular Australian corporations have been able to establish operations offshore, their success of itself 
has not depended upon their relative size in Australia. …  Conversely there are notable illustrations 
where corporations which have achieved growth by merger in Australia have not succeeded in their 
offshore expansion, …’); State Chamber of Commerce, above n 43, 4 (‘[t]here are many examples of 
firms competing internationally without being the dominant firm in the domestic market.  There are 
around 25,000 businesses engaged in exporting, with over 95% being small and medium enterprises 
…’); CCAAC, above n 43, 3; Communications Law Centre, above n 43, 7.  See also Fels, above n 32 
(‘[there] are several examples of smaller companies achieving great export success.  Cowan Manufactur-
ing at Warner Bay NSW, supplies recompression chambers to export markets including the United States 
navy.  This year it expects to double exports to around $1.2 million.  Compumedics makes computer 
based medical monitoring and diagnostic equipment at its Melbourne plant.  Last year it earned $7 
million on export markets.  Perini & Scott Masterman is a small Sydney firm supplying electrical control 
systems for cranes.  Its exports of $2 million constitute approximately two thirds of its annual turnover 
… the figures … show that exporting is not the exclusive preserve of big business …’).  
50  State Chamber of Commerce, above n 43, 4 (‘… Australia’s small domestic market means that even if 
monopolies were created in certain industries, the size of the new mega-firm would still be too small to 
have a significant impact on the global market.  … ‘). 
 and that, in any event, the current process al-
51  AAMI, above n 41, 2 (‘AAMI does not believe that any action proposed by Australian companies to 
acquire the scale perceived as needed for them to be able to compete internationally should disadvantage 
other Australian businesses and consumers.‘); State Chamber of Commerce, above n 43, 3 (‘… we are 
concerned any lowering of the merger hurdles could be unduly detrimental to smaller domestic-oriented 
firms operating in the same industry … [4] … [questions whether] it is worth sacrificing domestic 
competition to achieve these international gains.  …’); CCAAC, above n 43, 4 (‘Australian consumers 
should not have to tolerate (and pay the price for) monopolies or oligopolies on the basis that such are 
necessary to enable Australian corporations to gain sufficient scale to compete effectively overseas.  
There is simply no evidence to support this indeed, the evidence is to the contrary’); National Associa-
tion of Retail Grocers of Australia (NARGA), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 126, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 5 (‘[n]ational 
champions must not come at the expense of domestic competition and its benefits to domestic consum-
ers’); Spier Consulting, above n 42, 22 (‘[g]lobal issues are important, but so are domestic. …’); Victo-
rian Government, above n 30, 13 (‘[t]he ‘national champion’ argument … could result in Australian 
consumers paying higher prices to help support businesses charging lower prices to overseas consum-
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ready allows for international considerations, including the consideration 
of import competition, at the clearance stage and as part of the authorisa-
tion process;52
• the current system cannot be said to inappropriately impede mergers given 
the high approval rate;
  
53
• the dominance test would be detrimental;
 
54
• we need competitive markets;
 
55
• change is not called for because it would make no discernable difference to 
the outcome;
 
56
                                                                                                                                       
ers’); Communications Law Centre, above n 43, 7 (‘domestic consumers should [not have to] subsidise 
the performance of domestic firms in international markets’). 
52  ACCC, above n 42, 137 (‘[t]he extent of international competition is given full consideration in the 
Commission’s merger assessment process.  Section 50(3)(a) requires that the Commission consider the 
[138] actual and potential level of import competition … The Commission has not objected to any 
merger where comparable and competitive imports have held a sustained market share of 10 per cent or 
more for at least 3 years.  … The merger authorisation process also places a heavy emphasis on the 
international competitiveness of Australian industry. … [144] … the Commission has never opposed a 
merger where imports constrain the exercise of domestic market power’); Spier Consulting, above n 42, 
21 (notes that mergers in sectors already exposed to international trade are not opposed (10% imports) 
and authorisation is possible; ‘[c]learly the framework of the Act is not an obstacle to allowing Austra-
lian firms to merge, to achieve the scale necessary for international competitiveness providing there is 
sufficient public benefit. …’).  See also Fels, above n 32 (‘[t]he authorisation provisions of the Act are 
available to those firms that want to ensure international competitiveness through acquisition. … Since 
1993, the Act has explicitly stated that export generation, import replacement or contributions to the 
international competitiveness of the Australian economy are public benefits’). 
53 See Brebner, above n 42,  6 (‘… a statistical assessment of mergers considered by the ACCC since the 
introduction of the substantial lessening of competition test provides no evidence that it is impeding, 
unreasonably, the ability of firms to merge.  It has been statistically rare for the ACCC to oppose pro-
posed mergers.  Of the 1328 mergers fully considered by the ACCC between 1993 and 2001 … only 100 
(or 7.5%) were opposed.  Of these, 42 were resolved through enforceable undertakings by the parties, 
leaving only 4.4% opposed and not resolved.  This number appears to be dropping … These statistics 
hardly provide evidence of an overly intrusive enforcement body prohibiting all merger activity desired 
by business.  Rather, it reflects appropriate application of the current test with the ACCC challenging 
only those mergers that would genuinely lead to substantial lessening of competition in the market).  See 
also QRTSA, above n 42, 7 (‘[g]iven that the vast majority of acquisitions (mergers) are not prevented 
by the present s 50, any suggestion that s 50 stands in the way of acquisitions (mergers) must be dis-
missed’); State Chamber of Commerce, above n 43, 4 (‘[t]he current regime is clearly not unduly 
inhibiting mergers because the overwhelming majority of applications are approved’); Association of 
Consulting Engineers Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 89, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 10; Business Law Com-
mittee of the Law Council of Australia, above n 43, 54 (‘… where an Australian firm is actually trading 
in a global market, a merger, even within a highly concentrated Australian market, is unlikely to lead to a 
substantial lessening of competition, as the Australian firms will continue to be subject to international 
competition’). 
54 State Chamber of Commerce, above n 43, 4 (‘… concerned that a return to the market dominance test 
would be detrimental to the competitive environment …’); Victorian Government, above n 30, 12; 
Canberra Consumers, above n 44, 1. 
55 ANZ, above n 42, 4 (‘... supports current merger law … the interest of the Australian economy and the 
public interest generally, are enhanced by competitive markets and does not support he creation of anti-
competitive market structures.’); Brebner, above n 42, 2. 
 
56  SFE Corporation, above n 10, 10 (‘SFE doubts whether a change from the substantial lessening of 
competition to the dominance test would make any discernible difference to the likely outcome of the 
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• the current test accords with that applied in comparable jurisdictions;57
• the current test maintains consistency with other provisions in Part IV of 
the TPA and with the object of the Act.
 and 
58
Given the volume of submissions the Committee received on this issue, it was 
anticipated they would address it in some detail; that is, that there would be some 
discussion in the Report regarding whether there was any merit in the  claims that a 
return to the dominance test was warranted or that the current test inappropriately 
impeded international competition.
 
59
Unfortunately no such analysis was provided.  Extraordinarily the Committee did 
not even acknowledge that there had been submissions made for a return to the 
market dominance test, or that the provisions needed watering down to facilitate 
firms achieving a sufficient size to be able to successfully compete internationally.
   
60
Ultimately, without mentioning the ‘dominance’ claims, the Committee concluded 
that the ‘underlying assumption [of Part IV of the TPA is] that competition pro-
motes efficiency, which in turn enhances public welfare …’
    
The absence of discussion on this issue is surprising in light of the fact that the first 
term of reference for the Review required the Committee to identify if any provi-
sions of Part IV of the TPA ‘inappropriately impede the ability of Australian indus-
try to compete locally and internationally’.  Nowhere is this issue more acute than 
in relation to s 50. 
61
                                                                                                                                       
majority of mergers proposed. …’); Pengilley, above n 29 (‘[m]y guess is that an analysis of company 
mergers since the introduction of the “substantial lessening of competition” test would show that most of 
those disallowed would also come within the previous dominance test …’). 
57  Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 33 (‘[t]he current section 50 accords with most comparable 
jurisdictions …’); Spier Consulting, above n 42, 20; Business Law Committee of the Law Council of 
Australia, above n 42, 54 (reverting to a dominance test ‘would be inconsistent with current international 
practice’); Victorian Government, above n 30, 3.   
58 Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 33 (‘The current section 50 … maintains consistency of thresholds 
within the TPA …’); Brebner, above n 42, 2 (the SLC test ‘is the one most aligned with the object of the 
Act, namely, preserving and promoting competition …  If this is what the Act promotes then if follows 
that conduct substantially lessening competition should be prohibited.   On the other hand, a test that 
prohibits mergers only when they create or enhance market dominance is contrary to these goals because 
it necessarily permits mergers which substantially lessen competition.  This, … would reduce, rather than 
‘enhance’, the ‘welfare’ of Australians. …); Spier Consulting, above n 42, 20 (the current test ‘… 
maintains consistency of thresholds within the TPA.’); AAPT Limited, above n 42, 14.  See also Cooney 
Report, above n 9, 48 (para’s 3.109-3.110) (‘[t]he philosophy underlying Part IV of the Trade Practices 
Act is the protection and enhancement of competition.  Implicit in Part IV is the assumption that acts or 
occurrences which substantially lessen competition contravene the Act, unless authorised … on public 
benefit grounds. … The existence of a dominance test in the area of merger regulation is difficult to 
reconcile with the essential thrust of the Act which is directed to preventing anticompetitive conduct.’) 
59  See, for example, Clegg & Hepworth, above n 41 (‘[t]he head of the national competition law group at 
Freehills, Donald Robertson, says he expects the issue [of national champions] will be addressed during 
the Federal Government’s inquiry into the [TPA]’). 
60  The Committee did acknowledge the sale argument very briefly in the context of submissions refer-
ring to a change to the definition of market: Dawson Report, above n 1, 59-60.  However, the Committee 
did not discuss or reach any conclusion on the matter, but simply noted that international competitive-
ness was best left to be determined by the authorisation process. 
61  Dawson Report, above n 1, 43.  It is unclear on what basis the Committee made this assumption. 
 and that the substan-
tial lessening of competition test currently applied is the one most in line with this 
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assumption.  Thus, while making no formal recommendation that the existing test 
for assessing mergers be retained, this acknowledgement, combined with the ab-
sence of any recommendation to the contrary, signalled the Committee’s endorse-
ment of the test in its current form.   
As highlighted in a number of submissions, the current test is consistent with the 
express objective of the TPA, to ‘enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition …’ (emphasis added).62   It follows from this purpose 
that conduct substantially lessening competition should be prohibited.  A test that 
prohibits mergers only when they create or enhance market dominance is contrary 
to this goal because it necessarily permits mergers which not only lessen competi-
tion, but do so substantially.  Furthermore, the promotion and preservation of com-
petition is a legitimate and desirable purpose for which our national trade practices 
law should aspire.  Competition, in general, enhances the welfare of Australians by 
driving down prices, increasing consumer choice and providing an incentive for 
research, development and quality control.  It is also the case that there is little 
evidence to support the national champions argument advanced in several submis-
sions, whereas empirical evidence exists which suggests that the reverse (that is 
strong domestic competition) is more likely to facilitate international competitive-
ness.63
2 Efficiency defence/consideration 
  Consequently, the Dawson Committee’s decision not to recommend change 
to the substantial lessening of competition test is to be welcomed.   
Nevertheless, the volume of submissions, the historical debate over this issue (in 
Australia and internationally) and the key term of reference dealing with interna-
tional competitiveness make the Committee’s failure to comment on  these submis-
sions unfortunate.  
A number of submissions argued that efficiency claims should be given more 
prominence in the substantive analysis of mergers.64  In particular, it was argued 
that an efficiency defence should be incorporated,65
                                                          
62  TPA s 2, as inserted by section 3 of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth) (emphasis added). 
63  The validity of this evidence was challenged in some submissions.  See, for example, ICC, above n 
39, 25 (‘[t]ypical arguments concerning the detrimental effects of mergers draw from irrelevant empiri-
cal studies …’). 
64 See generally, SFE Corporation, above n 10, 1 (‘the focus [of any change] should be on finding the 
best way of ensuring that countervailing public interest issues – including those relating to efficiencies – 
are considered and given proper weight’). 
65 Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 12 (argued for public benefit defence that would include 
efficiency gains); Business Law Committee of the Law Council of Australia, above n 42, 58 (argued 
efficiency-enhancing mergers, as a matter of policy, should be permitted).  There was also some express 
opposition to such a defence: Spier Consulting, above n 42, 12 (‘… the inclusion of issues such as 
efficiencies has not worked in Canada and has so far not allowed mergers found to be a breach of 
competition law to proceed.’) 
 so that proof that a merger 
would enhance economic efficiency would provide a defence to a claim that the 
merger would result in a substantial lessening of competition.  Other submissions 
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sought express mention of efficiency considerations in s 50(3) of the Act,66
In discussing these proposals the Committee stated that they considered economic 
efficiency a more appropriate test for mergers.
 which 
currently lists a number of factors required to be taken into account when assessing 
whether a merger substantially lessens competition. 
67  This is an extraordinary (and 
controversial) finding, and is apparently based on the Committee’s understanding 
that the object of s 50 is to enhance the welfare of Australians through increased 
economic efficiency.  In doing this the Committee seem to have equated “competi-
tion” with “economic efficiency”,68 given that the clear object of the Act (including 
s 50),69 is expressed in s 2 as being ‘to enhance the welfare of Australians through 
the promotion of competition …’ (emphasis added).70
In most circumstances maximising competition will maximise economic efficiency.  
Thus, a test that prevents the substantial lessening of competition will generally be a 
good test for economic efficiency.  However, there may be circumstances in which a 
merger will offer gains in efficiency but will also SLC. 
  That is, it is competition and 
not economic efficiency that is to be promoted.  While these concepts overlap – 
often considerably - the Committee itself recognised, elsewhere in its Report, that 
they were not the same thing: 
71
[Section 50] does not address the situation where a merger fails the competition test, but 
offers economic efficiencies with the potential to enhance overall welfare.
 
72
                                                          
66 SFE Corporation, above n 10, 14 (section 50(3) should ‘make specific reference to the consideration of 
efficiencies’); Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 12 (‘[t]he factors in s 50(3) must ‘recognize 
efficiency gains and issues of scale’); ABA, above n 42, 11; Business Law Committee of the Law 
Council of Australia, above n 42, 57 (‘… assessment of the competitive impact of a merger should also 
take into account the pro-competitive contributions of efficiencies’). 
67 Dawson Report, above n 1, 56 (‘… economic efficiency is ultimately the more appropriate test for 
assessing the desirability or undesirability of a merger …’).  A few submissions also claimed efficiency 
was more important than competition: Productivity Commission, above n 41, 47 (’[t]he key requirement 
is to examine mergers from a primarily economic perspective and to only block significant market 
consolidation when it is likely to detract from economic efficiency’); Business Law Committee of the 
Law Council of Australia, above n 42, 58 (claims efficiency-enhancing mergers, as a matter of policy, 
should be permitted).  Compare Spier Consulting, above n 42, 15 (‘… [t]he authorisation process is not 
solely about economic efficiency … it is about public benefit in its broadest.  The Law is ultimately 
about consumer welfare’).  For a view that in a small economy economic efficiency should be given 
priority over all other goals see Gal, above n 40, 1451 (‘… small economies … are less able to afford a 
competition policy that sacrifices economic efficiency for broader objectives.  Where social goals 
conflict with economic efficiency, both goals cannot be materially promoted. …’).  
68 Dawson Report, above n 1, 58.  See also Gal, above n 40, who clearly distinguishes the two by sug-
gesting economic efficiency should be advanced at the expense of ‘other’ social goals.   
69 There is no separate object in the TPA for the operation of s 50. 
70 TPA s 2. 
71 Dawson Report, above n 1, 56. 
   
72 Dawson Report, above n 1, 56.  In noting this the Committee referred to Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1994) 49 FCR 211, 248 (Drummond J): ‘Provisions such as s 
50 are not tools designed to enable the Court to strike a balance between the economic advantages that 
might flow from the economies of scale and other efficiencies resulting from a particular merger, on the 
one hand, and the economic detriments of the merger, such as increased prices that consumers may have 
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It is suggested that the Committee erred in finding that the object of s 50 is to in-
crease economic efficiency.  This error, in turn, taints the Committee’s statement 
that economic efficiency is ‘the more appropriate test for assessing the desirability 
or undesirability of mergers’.73
Nevertheless, despite believing efficiency to be a better test and highlighting eco-
nomic efficiency as ‘an important goal because it is reflected in high productivity, 
which in turn is important to sustaining economic welfare’, the Committee recom-
mended against the proposed change for a number of reasons.  First, they noted that 
where there are other efficiencies, that have the potential to enhance overall wel-
fare, authorisation is possible.  Thus, where there are gains in efficiency but also a 
substantial lessening of competition, the Committee considered authorisation to be 
the most appropriate avenue
  This is not to reject the possibility that economic 
efficiency may be a better test for mergers – although the author does not share this 
view – it is simply to observe that, in the context of the TPA, economic efficiency is 
not the most appropriate test to fulfil the stipulated purpose of enhancing consumer 
welfare through the promotion of competition.  This purpose is best achieved by a 
competition and not an efficiency test, even if in many case the same result will be 
reached. 
74
If efficiencies are likely to result in lower (or not significantly higher) prices, increased 
output and/or higher quality goods or services, the merger may not substantially lessen 
competition.
 for parties wishing to proceed with claim their 
merger.   
Second, where efficiencies are relevant to the competition test they are already 
required to be considered.  In this respect the Committee makes note of the ACCC 
merger guidelines: 
75
Finally, and most importantly, the Committee believed that an efficiency test within 
s 50 would inhibit the ability of the ACCC to provide a quick clearance process 
 
Consequently, they rejected calls to incorporate a new factor in s 50(3) requiring 
specific consideration of efficiency in assessing the competitive effects of a merger. 
                                                                                                                                       
to pay, on the other.  …’  Further quoting Drommond J (at 248), the Committee accepted: ‘It is no 
answer [to a finding of a contravention of s 50] to show, eg, that a moderate reduction in price competi-
tion resulting from a particular merger would be greatly off-set, so far as the general public interest in the 
efficient allocation of resources is concerned, by benefits created by the merger.  Any such balancing 
exercise is for the Trade Practices Commission to carry out in dealing with an authorisation application 
under ss 88(9) and 90(9), not the Court that has to consider whether s 50 bars a particular merger.’  
73  Dawson Report, above n 1, 56. 
74  Ibid. 
75  ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, above n 7, 60. Further, ‘[w]hile recognising that precise quantification 
of such efficiencies is not generally possible, the Commission will require strong and credible evidence 
that such efficiencies are likely to accrue and that the claimed benefits for competition are likely to 
follow.’  See also Philip Williams and Graeme Woodbridge, ‘The Relation of Efficiencies to the Sub-
stantial Lessening of Competition Test for Mergers: Substitutes or Complements?’ (2002) 30 Australian 
Business Law Review 435. 
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because of increased complexity.76  Along the same lines, such a test would also 
give the ACCC more discretion than it currently has,77
The Committee did not consider separately the possibility of introducing an ‘effi-
ciency defence’
 something the Committee 
considered undesirable. 
78
3 Public benefit test as part of s 50 test 
 (which would throw the burden of proof of efficiency gains on the 
parties) as some had advocated.  Given the elevated status the Committee were 
prepared to give economic efficiency, their failure to address this issue is surprising 
and unfortunate. 
A number of submissions called for public benefits to be incorporated at the clear-
ance stage79 or, specifically, combined with the existing substantive test so that 
merger assessment, where public benefits are relevant, would become a one-stage 
process.80  There were also a number of submissions that were opposed to this 
proposal.81
                                                          
76  Dawson Report, above n 1, 57. 
77  Dawson Report, above n 1, 57. (‘… application of an efficiency test at the clearance stage would 
confer on the ACCC a significantly greater degree of discretion in deciding whether to clear or to oppose 
a merger proposal’).   
78  The Committee’s discussion of efficiencies appeared only in the context of replacing the substantial 
lessening of competition test with an efficiency test. 
79  SFE Corporation, above n 10, 13 (‘the regulator should not be encouraged to give primacy to competi-
tion issues over public benefit arguments’); IBSA, above n 12, 1 (‘[s]ection 50 should be modified to 
deal with mergers that substantially lessen competition and are likely to disadvantage consumers’). 
 
80  IBSA, above n 12, 1 (‘… the competition test in Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act should be 
combined with a public benefit test including the elements already identified in Section 90 – export 
potential, import replacement and international competitiveness – and other relevant factors’) at 3 
(‘IBSA believes there is merit in changing the merger approval process to combine the competition test 
and the public interest test in a one-stage process. This would require the ACCC to assess all mergers 
referred to it in terms of their likely impact on competition and consumer welfare and whether they 
would be compatible with broader economic and social objectives. These could include …’) and at 5 
(‘[s]ection 50 should be amended to refer to mergers that would substantially lessen competition and are 
likely to significantly disadvantage consumers); CSR Limited, above n 39, 1 (‘… the public benefits test 
should become part of section 50, such that a merger would not contravene section 50 even if it substan-
tially lessened competition in a market so long as the public benefit outweighed the public detriment’); 
Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 12 (‘the current public interest criteria in section 90 should be 
introduced into section 50 itself) and at 50 (s 50 should be redrafted to enable public interest test in s 90 
to become ‘a statutory defence to a claim that a merger resulted in a substantial lessening of competi-
tion’); UBS Warburg Australia, above n 39, 7 (test should be changed so that ‘a merger proposal is only 
rejected under section 50 if “any resultant reduction in competition outweighs the public benefit”’); 
Freehills, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Public Submission 135, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 3 (public benefit test should be part of a two-
tiered s 50); Business Law Committee of the Law Council of Australia, above n 42, 54 (‘… a “public 
benefits” qualification for mergers should be incorporated directly into s50 to supplement the current 
authorisation process.  Public benefits, … could then be considered in the informal clearance process, … 
); Victorian Government, above n 30, 17 (‘… mixing of competition and public benefit considerations 
could be given statutory recognition’); Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission to the Review of the Compe-
tition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 162, Trade Practices Act Review 
2002, 6 (public benefit considerations should exist within s 50 ‘to ensure that the ACCC takes public 
benefit considerations into account as part of the informal process’); Minerals Council of Australia, 
 
 58   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 8 NO 2 
 
 
None of these submissions were mentioned in the Committee’s report. 
4 Other factors to be incorporated in section 50(3) 
In addition to claims that efficiencies and public benefits should be specifically 
identified as a factor to be considered in a substantial lessening of competition 
analysis, several submissions also claimed that other matters, such as rural and 
regional issues,82 small business considerations83 and international competitiveness84 
should be referred to in section 50(3).85
… the suggestion in some submissions that section 50(3) explicitly require the con-
sideration of additional factors such as international competitiveness and rural and 
regional issues raise matters which may not be relevant to the competition test.  
Those matters are best dealt with in the authorisation process.
  The Committee briefly noted that these 
matters were best dealt with as part of the authorisation process: 
86
                                                                                                                                       
Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submis-
sion 178, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 4-5 (public benefits should be considered as part of s 50 
analysis); Securities Institute of Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 193, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 2 (should amend s 
50 to require the public benefits of a merger proposal to be considered at the same time as the implica-
tions for competition’). 
81  Australian Consumers’ Association (ACA), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 105, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 6 (oppose 
public benefit test as part of main test – because then it would be considered ‘behind closed doors’ 
instead of publicly); Armitage, above n 42, 1; Canberra Consumers, above n 44, 2 (opposed to public 
benefit test - ‘[p]roposals to amend s 50 and s 87B, which would see the public benefits test inserted into 
the initial consideration of a merger mean that the supposed benefits of a merger would not be subject to 
public scrutiny before a merger is agreed.  There is no reason to accord business this level of confidential 
privilege …’).  See also Fels, above n 13 (‘[i]ncorporating an upfront public benefit test would under-
mine the substantial lessening of competition test, erode the effectiveness and transparency of the law 
and deny consumers, suppliers and others the right of merits review.’)  
82  QRTSA, above n 42, 7; Association of Consulting Engineers Australia, above n 53, 12-13; Liquor 
Stores Association of Victoria Inc, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 124, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 16; NARGA, above n 51, 
9. 
83  QRTSA, above n 42, 7; Association of Consulting Engineers Australia, above n 53, 12-13; NARGA, 
above n 51, 9. 
84  Many of the submissions dealing with this were considered in the context of the dominance/national 
champions arguments, however some also called for an additional factor to be added to s 50(3), recognis-
ing the need to compete internationally.  See, for example Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 7 (recom-
mended adding the following factors:  ‘the likelihood of a significant enhancement in the ability of an 
Australian enterprise to compete more effectively with global competitors in Australia’ and ‘the likeli-
hood of a significant enhancement in the ability of an Australian enterprise to compete more effectively 
in global markets’); Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 10. 
85  Other submissions called for inclusion of failing firms and general public interest considerations into s 
50(3): Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 12 (s 50(3) should ‘include considerations such as 
efficiency gains, and impact on Australian jobs and failing companies’); Business Law Committee of the 
Law Council of Australia, above n 42, 2 & 60 (failing firms); Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 9. 
86  Dawson Report, above n 1, 57-58. 
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While it is perhaps true that most of these factors were more suited to a public 
benefit analysis (as part of the authorisation process), rather than a competition 
analysis, this was not true for all.  For example, specific mention of rural and re-
gional factors may be relevant in that it would require the ACCC to consider how a 
merger might effect competition in those areas; similarly, a failing firm in the 
market is relevant to a competition analysis because it would require the ACCC to 
consider what the state of competition would be, should the firm in question fail.  
This, of course, does not mean they need to be listed in 50(3) – certainly the ACCC 
can already take into account any matter that might be relevant to competition, but 
there is a difference between relevant factors listed in s 50(3) and factors which are 
not; that is the requirement that they be considered.  As a result, submissions in this 
respect deserved some real consideration by the Committee.  This is particularly so 
given one of the Committee’s terms of reference was to give consideration to the 
requirements of rural and regional Australia. 
 
5 Amendment to the definition of market 
The market, for the purpose of merger analysis is defined as a substantial market for 
goods or services in Australia, a State, a Territory or a region of Australia.87  A few 
submissions argued that it was necessary to widen the definition to better recognise 
the global marketplace.88  It was also argued that the definition of markets ‘should 
be subject to a minimum turnover threshold to exclude non-substantial markets’.89
While there were fewer submissions on this issue compared with others (for exam-
ple, a public benefit defence) the Committee found room in its report to comment in 
some detail on the first of these proposals.
 
90
                                                          
87  TPA s 50(6). 
88 Dawson Report, above n 1, 60.  For examples of submissions claiming the current definition was too 
restrictive see: Morgan & Hoggett, above n 29; UBS Warburg, above n 39, 7 (‘… the definition of 
market should take into account the flow of capital and labour, especially skilled labour, into and out of 
Australia’); Maureen Brunt, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 183, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 3 (the ‘narrow definition 
of “market” … in … s 50(6)’ is ‘glaringly inappropriate to the global challenge.’  Proposes the definition 
be amended to mean ‘a market in relation to Australia’); Business Council of Australia, above n 30, 16 
(supports proposals by Brunt).   
89 CSR Limited, above n 39, 2 (‘CSR proposes that section 50(6) be amended such that a market is 
deemed not to be substantial if the combined annual turnover of all participants in the market is less than 
a prescribed amount’. CSR suggests at least $10m). 
90 The second proposal – to introduce a minimum turnover threshold – was not mentioned in the Com-
mittee’s report. 
  The Committee rejected the claims that 
a broader definition was necessary to take account of global markets.  They claimed 
that regard can, and is, paid to imports when determining whether there is a sub-
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stantial lessening of competition,91
is unlikely to oppose mergers where there is a significant and sustained level of 
competition from imports in the relevant market.
 and made note of the ACCC’s  Merger Guide-
lines which state that the ACCC  
92
The Committee went on to note that if the issue of global competition was impor-
tant in a particular case and consideration of imports didn’t give due recognition to 
this, it was a factor that could be considered on a case-by-case basis in the authori-
sation process.
   
93
the adoption of a wider geographical definition of a market would risk ex-
tending the relevant market beyond national borders altogether, making it 
more difficult to demonstrate that the merger … would SLC.
   
Further, the Committee observed that  
94
Despite observing that a wider definition would make proving a contravention more 
difficult, the Committee noted, with apparent approval, the ACCC’s Merger Guide-
lines which acknowledge that it may, in appropriate cases, be ‘relevant to define the 
market as broader than Australia’.
   
This, of course, was the point of the submissions; that is, that as global markets 
extend beyond national borders, formal recognition of this should exist within the 
TPA which would, at least in respect of markets for traded items, make it more 
difficult to establish a lessening of competition – the argument being that it is less 
likely to substantially lessen competition; so much seems obvious.  
95  The Committee considered that, as a result of 
the ACCC applying – in some cases - a wider definition than that allowed by the 
legislation, any problem with the existing definition was already being adequately 
dealt with.  However, as Brunt correctly points out, while the Commission may 
have “solved” the problem of a restricted market definition through their merger 
guidelines, if the issue was litigated a ‘court might feel impelled to obey the statu-
tory definition’,96
In any event, if the Committee believed the ACCC’s merger guidelines to be appro-
priate, then why not recommend that this interpretation be given legislative effect?  
In addition, the argument that the authorisation process can accommodate any 
issues that do result in an overly narrow definition of market is flawed. Market 
definition is a necessary first step in applying the competition test.  If the existing 
 which does not allow for such a broad definition of market.  The 
Committee did not acknowledge this problem. 
                                                          
91 For more detail on the extent to which import competition is considered at the clearance stage see 
Brebner, above n 8. Generally, if imports comprise 10% or more of the relevant market the ACCC will 
clear the merger.   
92 Dawson Report, above n 1, 59.  See also Fels, above n 32 (‘[d]omestic mergers of Australian firms 
have not been opposed where there is a clear and identifiable constraint from offshore.’) 
93 Dawson Report, above n 1, 60 
94  Dawson Report, above n 1, 59 
95  ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, above n 7,  37 (para 5.63) 
96  Brunt, above n 88, 3. 
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test is inadequate it should be rectified, rather than leaving it to the authorisation 
process to undo any damage caused by an unrealistic definition of market – even if 
it could be demonstrated that the authorisation process was capable of achieving 
this objective, which is doubtful.  The Committee’s dealing with this issue – or 
rather their failure to deal with it - was unsatisfactory. 
6 Creeping acquisitions 
Finally, it was submitted that the law should be changed to deal directly with creep-
ing acquisitions.97
Some submissions argued that a ‘cap’ should be placed on the market share of 
companies, beyond which acquisitions should not be permitted (or at least not 
permitted without approval),
   This refers to the situation where no individual merger in a 
particular market will substantially lessen competition, but a number of small merg-
ers, over time, may have the same effect.  The majority of submissions on creeping 
acquisitions made reference to the retail grocery market as a prime example of 
creeping acquisitions which may ultimately result in a significant lessening of 
competition.   
98 while others argued that s 50 should be altered to 
allow the ACCC to take into consideration the cumulative effects of the current and 
previous mergers by the same party.99
                                                          
97  See, for example, Independent Paper Group, above n 42, 2; Small Business Development Corpora-
tion, above n 42, 5 (‘… current merger provisions are inadequate to prevent growth by “creeping acquisi-
tions” …’); Association of Consulting Engineers Australia, above n 53, 10 (‘[a] new specific prohibition 
against anti-competitive creeping acquisitions is called for … While a large acquisition by a dominant 
corporation can, be subject to close scrutiny by the ACCC, a series of minor acquisitions that together 
would substantially lessen competition are less likely to be subject to the same scrutiny. Where in fact 
scrutinised the ACCC faces considerable limitations on its ability to assess the cumulative effect of the 
creeping acquisitions on the level of competition. … ‘); Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 37; NARGA, 
above n 51, 9 (recommends ‘a new prohibition against anti-competitive creeping acquisitions be intro-
duced … [29] … although individually these minor or one-off acquisitions may not substantially lessen 
competition, they may collectively substantially lessen competition to the detriment of consumers. …’); 
National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia, Supplementary Submission 2 to the Review of the 
Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 206, Trade Practices Act 
Review 2002, 7 (recommends insertion of a new s 50(7) into s 50 ‘providing that where s50(1) and 
s50(2) do not prevent the acquisition, yet the cumulative effect of the proposed acquisition and previous 
acquisitions in any relevant market is to SLC in any relevant market, the proposed acquisition is not to 
proceed unless authorized or subject to an enforceable undertaking … [24] … Creeping acquisitions are 
an obvious way to avoid scrutiny under the existing s50)’; Victorian Government, above n 30, 3 (‘current 
merger law does not cover the gradual acquisition of small participants in an industry by a larger partici-
pant’).  
98  Association of Consulting Engineers Australia, above n 53, 11; Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, iv 
& 37; NARGA, above n 51, 81 (propose that a ‘concentrated market notice’ be issued when markets are 
identified as highly concentrated); Pharmacy Guild of Australia, above n 42, 2; Spier Consulting, above 
n 42, 22; WA Independent Grocers Association (Inc), Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, ‘Restoring Competitive Equality in an Increasingly Anti-
Competitive Environment’, Public Submission 158, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 13.  
 
99 Small Business Development Corporation, above n 42, 5; Association of Consulting Engineers 
Australia, above n 53, 10; Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 37 (recommends TPA provisions should 
be altered to allow ‘ACCC to take into consideration previous mergers and acquisitions by an acquirer 
and to aggregate the effect of previous mergers and assess the resultant state of competition …’); 
 
 62   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 8 NO 2 
 
The counter-argument to this, set out by the Dawson Committee in its report, was 
that a cap would ‘stifle competition and protect the unsustainable position of ineffi-
cient competitors’.100   The Committee believed that the current s 50, combined with 
the ACCC’s merger guidelines adequately dealt with creeping acquisitions.  They 
also accepted that a cap would prove ‘unworkable’ and could deny consumers 
access ‘to the products or services offered by an efficient producer’.101  Similarly, 
the Committee rejected (although not expressly) the proposal that the Government 
should declare highly concentrated industries102 which, once declared, would require 
notification to the ACCC before any acquisition could proceed.103
                                                                                                                                       
NARGA, above n 51, 29 (‘[w]here the cumulative effect of acquisitions is to substantially lessen compe-
tition, NARGA would submit that s 50 should allow consideration of such a cumulative effect. Not to do 
so has the potential to undermine the operation of s 50 in those instances where an entity can over time 
acquire a substantial degree of market power through relatively minor piecemeal or ad-hoc acquisi-
tions’); Boswell, above n 42, 17 (merger provisions could be amended ‘to allow the ACCC to take into 
consideration previous mergers … and to aggregate the effect of previous mergers’); Pharmacy Guild of 
Australia, above n 42, 2 (‘… the Act should be amended to allow the ACCC to take into consideration 
previous mergers and assess the resultant state of competition in any relevant market …’); Victorian 
Government, above n 30, 3, 12 & 15 (s 50 should be strengthened to ‘allow for cumulative effects rather 
than just ‘one-off’ acquisitions.  This could be sectorally based’ (at 3));  NARGA (supp 2), above n 97, 
7, 24-25.  It was also argued that the s 50(3) criteria should be amended to include a reference to creep-
ing acquisitions.  The Committee considered that the existing s 50(3) was already capable of addressing 
this issue where relevant: Dawson Report, above n 1, 67. 
100  Dawson Report, above n 1, 67. 
101 The Committee claim that the Baird Committee and ACCC both agree this would be unworkable 
(Dawson Report, above n 1, 67).  The Baird Committee reported in 1999: Joint Select Committee on the 
Retailing Sector (the Baird Committee), Fair Market or Market Failure? A Review of Australia’s 
retailing sector (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) (‘Baird Report’).  This report (at viii and 47-53) 
states that the Committee heard compelling evidence that a market cap (of the nature suggested to that 
Committee – which would have required divestiture of existing assets) would prove unworkable. The 
ACCC’s submission to the Dawson Report does not contain any suggestion that a cap as proposed in 
Dawson Review submissions would be unworkable.  The Baird Committee Report does, however, 
indicate that the then Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Allan Fels, provided evidence to the Baird 
Committee that there would be ‘significant mechanical problems associated with a market cap’ (Baird 
Report, viii; see also 51). 
102  See, for example, Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 37, which suggests that the Government could 
‘declare’ certain highly concentrated industries and ‘where declared any acquisitions would need to be 
notified to the ACCC and assessed by the ACCC on public benefit criteria …’. 
  The Committee 
claimed that compulsory notification:  
103  Despite supporting the Baird Committee’s finding on viability of a market ‘cap’, the Committee did 
not acknowledge the Baird Committee’s recommendation that “mandatory notification of retail grocery 
store acquisitions by publicly listed corporations be prescribed within the mandatory Code of Conduct 
(recommendation 5), and approved by the ACCC, with a requirement that the ACCC consult with local 
authorities and other relevant parties in order to make an informed assessment of the likely impact on 
local businesses of such acquisitions. …” (recommendation 4).  The Government rejected this proposal 
(‘the Government does not consider there is a need for mandatory pre-notification of retail grocery store 
acquisitions by publicly listed companies to be prescribed within a code of conduct. Mandatory 
pre-notification systems can be complex and difficult to administer. A pre-notification requirement 
would increase costs for businesses, and - most importantly - be unnecessary because the Trade Practices 
Act already prohibits acquisitions or mergers which would have the effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a substantial market’: Government Response to the Report of the Joint Select 
Committee on the Retailing Sector: Fair Market or Market Failure (December 1999) 4 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/retail_ctte/govt_resp.doc>).  However, the Dawson Commit-
tee does acknowledge that the current voluntary Retail Grocery Industry Code of Conduct provides that 
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might result in larger participants establishing new facilities rather than acquiring 
existing businesses, possibly to the detriment of those wanting to sell their busi-
ness.  
It is not clear why the Committee believed this would be the case.  If the test ap-
plied were to be something other than the existing substantial lessening of competi-
tion test (as suggested in some submissions) this may have some implications, but 
the Committee does not suggest the test applied would be different to the existing 
test.   
Requiring notification in certain industries, absent a modified substantive test would 
have virtually no effect at all – thus, the Committee was correct to reject this in 
isolation, though not for the reasons provided.  However, a mandatory notification 
requirement in certain industries, combined with a modified substantive test, such 
as one requiring the ACCC (and the courts) to combine the effect of the current 
acquisition with the effect of previous acquisitions by the same party, or one that 
required a general public benefit analysis before the merger could proceed, may 
assist in resolving the problems associated with creeping acquisitions. The Commit-
tee did not consider these proposals at all. 
In its general discussion of this issue the Committee noted that where a market is 
competitive, the preservation of the number of participants should be left to industry 
policy; competition law – which should focus on competition – was not the appro-
priate mechanism for the protection of the number of participants:104
[W]hile a genuine competitive environment exists, the preservation of the number 
of competitors in a market is more a matter for industrial policy than for competi-
tion policy.  A concentrated market may be highly competitive.
   
105
It is suggested that this reasoning is flawed.  While s 50 is designed to protect and 
preserve competition, it does not call on the ACCC to determine whether a genu-
inely competitive environment exists.  It calls upon the ACCC to determine whether 
the proposed merger would substantially lessen the existing level of competition; 
that is a different test.  A by-product of protecting competition in a market may also 
be the protection of some existing competitors.
   
106
                                                                                                                                       
industry participants will notify the ACCC of acquisitions (paragraph 8: 
<http://www.mediate.com.au/rgio/code.htm>). 
104  Dawson Report, above n 1, 67. 
105  Ibid. 
106  In that respect, the Chairman of the ACCC has acknowledged that: ‘[I]t may be the case that to 
promote and nurture competition in a market, it is necessary to intervene to protect competitors or a class 
of competitors in that market from substantial damage or indeed elimination as a result of a course of 
behaviour by another competitor’: Graeme Samuel, ‘A New Chairman of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission: A Change in Substance or a Change in Style?’, Melbourne Press Club, Mel-
bourne, 18 July 2003, 3 <http://www.accc.gov.au/speeches/2003/Samuel_Melb.pdf>.  Samuel also 
acknowledges that the ‘purpose of competition policy is to promote competition in the interests of 
consumers, not to preserve competitors or to protect certain sectors of business from the rigours of 
competition.’ 
  It is clearly possible for there to 
be a substantial reduction in competition despite a competitive environment remain-
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ing post-merger.  However, when small ‘creeping’ acquisitions each lessen compe-
tition by only a ‘small’ amount this criteria is unlikely to be satisfied, despite the 
fact that, over time, a number of these acquisitions might substantially lessen com-
petition – whether or not there remains a competitive market environment.  The 
question put before the committee by a number of submissions was, in effect, as 
follows: 
Why is one acquisition, that substantially lessens competition, prohibited, but a se-
ries of smaller acquisitions by the same party, which individually do not substan-
tially lessen competition, but have the combined effect of substantially lessening 
competition, not prohibited?   
This question was not answered by the Committee.  It is not clear whether they 
even understood the question.  For example, the Committee stated that  
[n]othing before the Committee suggests that the ACCC is not presently aware of 
acquisitions that raise competition concerns under section 50.107
Recently, Ergas has criticised this ‘dismissive view’ of creeping acquisitions.
  
Regardless of how aware the ACCC may be about creeping acquisitions, they are 
not able to effectively deal with them because they are restricted by the current 
legislative definition requiring ‘the’ current acquisition to substantially lessen 
competition, without regard to the cumulative effect of previous acquisitions.  The 
whole point of the submissions, which seems to have been lost on the Committee, 
was that creeping acquisitions do not meet the s 50 criteria. 
108
1 Reasons to be provided in some cases 
  He 
likens creeping acquisitions to hair loss – no one lost hair will make you bald, but if 
it keeps happening you’re in trouble.  Similarly with mergers, while no one merger 
in a particular industry may substantially lessen competition, several may do so 
without breaching the current provisions – which analyse only the current one.  
Ergas offers no easy solution, but also expresses his disappointment that the Com-
mittee didn’t consider it further.  This author agrees. 
 
B Retention of the informal clearance process with some 
modifications  
The first of the formal recommendations was that the current informal clearance 
process, whereby parties may voluntarily approach the ACCC seeking their views 
on a proposed merger, should be retained, but that the ACCC should be required to 
                                                          
107  Dawson Report, above n 1, 67. 
108 Henry Ergas, ‘Doubts about Dawson’ (Paper presented at the Competition Law Conference, Sydney, 
17 May 2003) <http://www.necg.com.au/pappub_PSRSAP.shtml>.  See also Henry Ergas, ‘Good 
Report, Pity About All the Flaws’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 18 June 2003, 63. 
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provide reasons for their decision in some cases.  Specifically, ‘adequate’ reasons 
must be provided where informal clearance is denied, or cleared subject to the 
parties providing enforceable undertakings and where the parties request reasons.109
This conclusion is in line with the majority of submissions on this issue.  Submis-
sions generally expressed satisfaction with the informal clearance system.
 
110  In 
particular, parties would prefer not to be required to notify the ACCC111 and are 
generally satisfied with the speed at which the ACCC provide their decisions.112    
However, a number of problems were identified in the submissions.  The three key 
complaints related to the lack of transparency,113
In respect of transparency, numerous submissions noted that they considered the 
current voluntary mergers register inadequate
 the lack of immunity from chal-
lenge by third parties or the ACCC and the fear that the ACCC may be able to use 
its position to extract undertakings from parties that are not necessary to alleviate 
the ACCC’s competition concerns. 
114 and called for reasons to be pro-
vided in some115 or all cases,116 provided confidential matters could be excluded.117
                                                          
109  Dawson Report, above n 1, 69.  The ACCC has recently announced that it will provide detailed 
reasons in the circumstances recommended in the Report: see ACCC, ‘ACCC to Publish Reasons for its 
Merger Decisions’ (Media Release 238/03, 12 November 2003).   
110  The ACCC does maintain a voluntary register but it is incomplete and does not provide much detail 
on the ACCC’s evaluation of the proposal.  See for example: United Energy, above n 12, 7 (the ‘flexibil-
ity inherent in the ACCC’s informal clearance process is generally in tune with the commercial realities 
of a merger. …’); ANZ, above n 10, 5 (‘… strengths [of informal clearance include] that mergers which 
obviously do not create any competition concerns can be dealt with expeditiously …’); Fair Trading 
Coalition, above n 42, 35 (the ‘Australian merger regime is one of the fastest and least cumbersome of 
those jurisdictions having merger control’); Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Submis-
sion to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 
120, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 21 (‘… the ACCC is understood to be world’s best practice in 
respect of timeliness for its informal consideration of merger proposals’); AAPT Limited, above n 42, 
14.  
111  See, for example, Law Council of Australia, which examined the cost and inefficiency experienced in 
other jurisdictions having a mandatory notification system (including the United States and the European 
Union) and concluded that given the significant administrative inefficiencies that would follow, there ‘is 
no demonstrable need for compulsory pre-merger notification in Australia (Law Council of Australia, 
above n 9, 14-17).   
112  Some submissions expressed dissatisfaction at the time frame for clearance and suggested the ACCC 
regularly exceeded the time frames they set for themselves.  See, for example, United Energy, above n 
12, 7 (‘… timing is a key issue for merging parties and this is one area the informal clearance process 
does not take into account.  … By simply delaying a decision on a merger the ACCC may be effectively 
blocking it from proceeding.  …’ [footnotes omitted]). 
113  See for example: United Energy, above n 12, 7 (‘… the process should be clearly set out in the TPA 
or an enforceable code in order to provide greater transparency.’) 
114   ANZ, above n 10, 6 (the voluntary competition analysis the ACCC presents ‘is perfunctory at best, 
usually just a couple of short paragraphs and rarely more than one page …’); SFE Corporation, above n 
10, 5 (‘[t]he volume and detail of any such information is at the discretion of the ACCC’); Brebner, 
above n 42, 7 (the voluntary register ‘is deficient in many respects.  It contains only limited information 
about the competition analysis undertaken and omits certain essential information in many cases …); and 
Securities Institute of Australia, above n 80, 1 (notes that the current process doesn’t require ACCC to 
provide full reasons and the reasons it does provide are often inconsistent). 
    
115  Those submissions that did not call for reasons in all cases (because of efficiency concerns) sug-
gested that reasons should be provided when either/or a merger was rejected, undertakings extracted, 
thresholds crossed or there was otherwise merit in providing reasons: see ANZ, above n 10, 6 
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In addition to improving transparency,118 the key reason given was the desire for 
development of precedent to ensure greater certainty and consistency.119  The major-
ity of submissions on this issue called for ‘substantial’120 or ‘detailed’121 reasons to 
be provided with a few suggesting a more detailed list of what should be contained 
in any published reasons.122
The Committee believed their recommendation
 
123 would address these concerns.  
Specifically, the Committee opined that it would allow development of precedent to 
overcome the current potential for inconsistency and the lack of predictability for 
merging parties124 and it would also limit the ability of the ACCC to extract unnec-
essary undertakings.125
                                                                                                                                       
(‘…complex cases and those that cross its concentration thresholds …); SFE Corporation, above n 10, 13 
(‘if it opposes a merger’); Law Council of Australia (supplementary), above n 9, 11 (international 
experience indicates ‘that if the ACCC were required to give written reasons in relation to every informal 
clearance application, these potential advantages may be outweighed by the inefficiency associated with 
the increased administrative burden. …’.  Written reasons should be required ‘where informal clearance 
is refused’ and ‘where informal clearance is granted or a no action letter is provided subject to s87B 
undertakings or other conditions’.  The ACCC could also choose to publish reasons in other cases, such 
as where market definition is contentious); and Business Council of Australia, Supplementary Submis-
sion to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 
197, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, x (more extensive reasons should be given where ACCC opposes 
a merger, the merger is cleared with conditions, ‘the merger raises new issues, or a new approach is 
adopted by the ACCC’, ‘the merger occurs in a sector of the economy not recently examined by the 
ACCC’ and/or, ‘they are requested by the parties’). 
116  Armitage, above n 42, 2; AAPT Limited, above n 42, 14; Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 
13 ( ‘… to clear or oppose a merger or acquisition …’); Minerals Council of Australia, above n 80, 5. 
117  National Farmers Federation, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 53, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 21; Telstra, above n 38, 
91. 
118 National Farmers Federation, above n 117, 21 (publishing reasons ‘will enable greater scrutiny of 
ACCC processes’); SFE Corporation, above n 10, 11 (‘… it seems incongruous for such a crucial 
decision to proceed using a process that remains relatively shrouded in mystery’); Brebner, above n 42, 
7; Armitage, above n 42, 2; Spier Consulting, above n 42, 22; Business Law Committee of the Law 
Council of Australia, above n 42, 61; AAPT Limited, above n 42, 14; Seven Network Ltd, Submission to 
the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 176, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 12.  
119  National Farmers Federation, above n 117, 21; ANZ, above n 10, 6; AAPT Limited, above n 42, 14. 
120  Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 12; ABA, above n 42, 2; Minerals Council of Australia, 
above n 80, 5 (‘substantive and substantial reasons …’). 
121  ANZ, above n 10, 6 (‘…detailed reasons’); Telstra, above n 38, 91 (‘… detailed reasoning …’);  SFE 
Corporation, above n 10, 13 (‘… detailed reasons and the contents of any expert opinions’). 
122  Armitage, above n 42, 2 (‘… reasons should include: the relevant market(s) identified by the ACCC 
and its reasons; the level of imports and the nature of the data accepted by the ACCC in that regard; the 
nature and extent of all relevant barriers to entry; the nature and extent of countervailing power in the 
market and the significance attached to it by the ACCC; and the ACCC’s position concerning any other 
matters raised by the parties to the transaction’);  Clayton Utz, Submission to the Review of the Competi-
tion Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 168, Trade Practices Act Review 
2002, 1-2 (reasons should address ‘in detail, the relevant market definition, the merger factors under 
section 50(3) and the arguments that the Commission rejected in its consideration of the merger. …’).  
123 Dawson Report, above n 1, 61. 
124  Ibid, 60-61. 
125  Ibid, 60. 
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This was, generally speaking, a good recommendation.  The current register is 
incomplete (and even inaccurate) in several respects and does not provide sufficient 
detail of the ACCC’s processes for any meaningful precedent to develop.  While 
not binding due to the appropriately voluntary nature of the process, any precedent 
that could be developed would, at the least, provide a valuable guide to the ACCC’s 
current thinking and increase the transparency of the ACCC’s processes.  Given that 
clearance is so heavily relied upon to determine whether a merger will proceed,126 it 
is desirable that such precedent develop to guide the parties.  It remains uncertain, 
however, what would constitute ‘adequate’ reasons.  Will it require explanation of 
how the ACCC evaluated market share or would a mere statement of market share 
determined suffice?  Will all factors in s 50(3) need to be analysed and discussed?  
It is also unclear, given the limited number of clearances denied, or cleared with 
undertakings, whether a sufficient volume of precedent could develop to provide a 
meaningful guide to parties.  In this respect, some consideration could have been 
given to the suggestion that the ACCC should be required to provide reasons every 
time ACCC thresholds were crossed.127
                                                          
126  SFE Corporation, above n 10, 11 (‘…Australian companies have made extensive use of the informal 
process [and] the informal clearance decision has attained a practical stature that may not have been 
initially anticipated by the ACCC or the legislature. In the limited time available for commercial deals to 
proceed, a negative informal clearance response from the ACCC may sound the death knell for a pro-
posed acquisition. … it seems incongruous for such a crucial decision to proceed using a process that 
remains relatively shrouded in mystery.’); ANZ, above n 10, 4 (‘… no section 50 cases have gone to 
court under the SLC test.  The end result is that the ACCC’s decisions on mergers essentially become de 
facto rulings’).   Corones, above n 10, 67 (because only the ‘ACCC and the Minister responsible for the 
TPA … have the statutory power to seek to enjoin mergers that are likely to substantially lessen competi-
tion pursuant to s. 80(1) of the TPA. … control over mergers has passed from the courts to the ACCC’). 
127 This would occur where a merger would lead to the four largest firms holding 75 per cent or more of 
the market share, with the merged form to supply at least 15 per cent of the market, or where the merged 
firm will supply 40 per cent or more of the market: ACCC, ‘Merger Guidelines’, above n 7, 28 (para 
5.27).   
 If this test were adopted, in place of the 
requirement for the ACCC to provide reasons whenever requested, it might also 
alleviate any concern that too many parties will ‘request’ reasons, even where 
proposals are relatively non-contentious.  
The test adopted by the Committee in relation to voluntary informal notifications 
might not, however, prove too problematic, provided it is implemented in conjunc-
tion with the Committee’s recommendation for a voluntary formal clearance proc-
ess.  This is because merger proponents who are concerned about achieving some 
sort of certainty are more likely to pursue the voluntary formal process.  This would 
leave virtually no cases in which reasons would need to be given under the informal 
system; it being almost inconceivable that those merger applications that currently 
fall within the 5% or less that raise competition concerns each year would be noti-
fied under this much more uncertain informal system. 
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2 No independent mergers review panel 
The Committee did not believe a review board was appropriate for the informal 
clearance process.128  Arguments included that a Review Panel similar to the Take-
overs Panel129 should be established,130 that an Independent Mergers Panel be estab-
lished generally, that a Mergers Review Panel be established for authorisation 
hearings only131 and that a Panel be available to review rejected or contentious 
mergers.132
In rejecting these proposals the Committee expressed concerns that this would 
involve a formalisation of the process that would detract from its current speed and 
efficiency
   
133 and that, in any event, a Panel would not be better equipped than the 
ACCC to assess the proposed mergers.134
                                                          
128 Dawson Report, above n 1, 60.  See submissions for a general Independent Mergers Panel by Speed, 
above n 28, 1 (‘[t]he Panel should act informally.  Its decisions should be final except on limited 
grounds.  The Panel should have power to constructively shape orders most suitable to the particular 
merger - with the emphasis on how best to strengthen competition and Australian business’); Investment 
and Financial Services Association Ltd (IFSA), Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 86, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 3 (‘[a]n 
independent Mergers Panel should be established to determine whether a merger above a certain thresh-
old is anti-competitive’); Telstra, above n 38, 92 (submits that a specialist merger division of the ACT 
should be created for formal clearance and authorisation appeals.  Another option might be to create a 
‘specialist, independent, merger review oversight panel’). 
129  The Takeovers Panel is the primary forum for dispute resolution in relation to takeover bids.  More 
information about the panel is available from its dedicated web site: <http://www.takeovers.gov.au/> 
130  IBSA, above n 12, 5 (‘[t]he Mergers Panel would be similar in concept to the Takeovers Panel, which 
reviews decisions of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’); UBS Warburg, above n 
39,  8 (‘… applicants could choose to apply directly to the panel rather than wait for an ACCC decision 
… operate in a similar manner to the Takeovers Panel, separate from the ACCC …. Accountability and 
transparency will improve …. Also … should be required to give “post decision reviews” …’); Law 
Council of Australia, above n 9, 18. 
131 NARGA, above n 51, 12 (proposes the ‘creation of a specialized ACCC Merger Authorization 
Taskforce or Unit’). 
132 UBS Warburg, above n 39, 8 (should introduce ‘an independent panel as a first point of review of 
rejected mergers … Alternatively applicants could choose to apply directly to the panel rather than wait 
for an ACCC decision …’); Business Law Committee of the Law Council of Australia, above n 42, 64 
(‘... an Independent review panel should be set up to review informal clearance decisions …’); Allens 
Arthur Robinson, above n 80, 6 (argues for introduction of ‘independent review panel to refer a decision 
back to the ACCC for further analysis or to substitute its own decision …’); Clayton Utz, above n 122, 3 
(argues for a ‘quick and efficient administrative review mechanism, by a Review Panel’ only available 
‘for informal merger clearance decisions by the Commission …’); Woolworths Limited, Submission to 
the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 171, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 39 (in certain circumstances (eg, where issues are contentious), ‘there should 
be an independent Competition Review Board, which could monitor and review the ACCC’s decision on 
an individual case and overall ACCC policies and guidelines …’); Securities Institute of Australia, above 
n 80, 2; Law Council of Australia (supp), above n 9, 18 (an independent review panel would ‘impose a 
discipline on the ACCC’s informal clearance process in the same way as an appeals process’); IBSA, 
above n 12, 1 (‘[a]n independent expert Mergers Panel should be appointed by the Treasurer to consider 
contentious merger applications and resolve any differences between consumer interests and the broader 
national interest.’) 
133  Dawson Report, above n 1, 60. 
134  Ibid 61. 
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The cursory nature of the Committee’s dealing with these submissions can probably 
be attributed, in part at least, to their recommendation for a voluntary clearance 
process which would provide an avenue for appeal. 
3 Additional recommendations regarding the informal clear-
ance process 
Other submissions argued that there should be mandatory penalties if a merger, 
which later proves to be anti-competitive, is not notified135 and that there should be 
fees imposed on requests for clearance in order to avoid unnecessary notifica-
tions.136
C Voluntary formal clearance process 
  Neither of these proposals were mentioned in the Committee’s report. 
To overcome the other perceived limitations of the informal clearance process – 
that is, that it does not provide parties with sufficient certainty and it suffers from a 
lack of accountability - the Committee recommended the creation of a voluntary 
formal clearance process to operate parallel to the existing process.137  This process 
would provide successful applicants with immunity from legal challenge.138
The Committee made it clear that it did not consider that notification should be 
compulsory.  The voluntary nature of this process is designed to ensure both parties 
and the ACCC do not suffer the costs and other administrative burdens associated 
with a compulsory notification system and would also be in line with current prac-
tice in New Zealand.
   
139
The Committee acknowledged that this ‘formal’ process would be less efficient 
than the informal process and would require parties to provide more detailed infor-
mation on their proposed merger.  Information required for the application should 
be set out in revised ACCC Merger Guidelines and be sufficient for a ‘reasoned 
assessment’ but should not be ‘onerous’.
   However, for reasons set out below, it is not clear whether 
the ACCC would, in practice, avoid the costs and administrative burdens associated 
with a mandatory notification system. 
140
                                                          
135  Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35 (failure to notify, when eventual breach is found, should 
‘attract a mandatory extra penalty’); Pharmacy Guild of Australia, above n 42, 2 (mandatory penalties 
should be applied for failure to notify ‘where a merger is subsequently determined to have SLC’); Spier 
Consulting, above n 42, 22.   
136  Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35; Spier Consulting, above n 42, 23.  
137  Dawson Report, above n 1, 70, recommendation 2.2.  The Committee believed that ‘[t]he creation of 
a voluntary formal process that would operate in parallel with the existing informal system would seem 
to offer the best of both worlds’: at 61. 
138  ‘The applicant would have immunity from proceedings by any party while complying with any 
conditions specified by the ACCC as a condition of the approval of the merger. The ACCC would be 
required to monitor compliance’: Dawson Report, above n 1, 70 (recommendation 2.2.1).   
139  Dawson Report, above n 1, 62. 
140  Dawson Report, above n 1, 70 (recommendation 2.2.2). 
  The ACCC would have 40 days to 
review a proposal and make a decision.  Time could be capable of extension only at 
the request of the applicant.  If no decision was given within 40 days clearance 
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would be deemed refused.141  The Committee recommended that appropriate rea-
sons be required,142 though it is not clear how this would work where a proposal is 
deemed refused because of the absence of a decision within 40 days. The merger 
proponents (not third parties) would then have the opportunity to appeal within 14 
days to the Tribunal which would have 30 days to review the material and reach a 
decision whether to clear a merger, refuse clearance or provide a conditional clear-
ance.143
The Committee considered that this process would increase accountability of the 
ACCC,
   
144
The Committee acknowledged that this process would effectively remove the rights 
of interested third parties to challenge a merger once clearance is given, but be-
lieved this could be addressed by requiring the ACCC to engage in ‘appropriate’ 
consultation with interested third parties.
 provide parties with greater certainty when proceeding with a merger and, 
because of its optional nature, would mean that the benefits of the informal clear-
ance system could be retained. 
145
Given the recommendation, there were surprisingly few submissions on this issue.  
Some simply noted the problem of ‘uncertainty’ with the existing system,
   
146 some 
called for statutory recognition of the current process to allow those mergers that 
were cleared to proceed with certainty,147 some specifically called for a formal 
notifications system to compliment the existing informal one148 and a few expressed 
opposition to the idea of a voluntary formal clearance process.149
The option of a voluntary formal clearance system is a good one, provided some 
difficulties, which were not addressed by the Dawson Committee, could be over-
 
                                                          
141  Ibid (recommendation 2.2.3).  However, note that the Committee considered that the applicant should 
be able to apply for an extension of time. 
142  Dawson Report, above n 1, 62. 
143  Ibid 64.  The Tribunal hearing would not be a hearing de novo and should be made within 30 days.  
The Tribunal could clear, reject or clear subject to conditions: recommendation 2.2.4. 
144  Dawson Report, above n 1, 61-62 
145  Ibid 64. 
146 Shell Australia, Submission to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
1974, Public Submission 15, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 5 (‘… the current informal clearance 
process … does not give the parties to the proposal a sufficient degree of certainty, in that … the pro-
posal remains exposed to attack from third parties); ANZ, above n 10, 4; Australian Industry Group, 
above n 29, 12 (‘[r]esort to the informal process of clearance leads to uncertainty and cannot satisfy 
commercial and legal requirements that require unequivocal approvals’); Telstra, above n 38, 92. 
147 Shell Australia, above n 146, 1 (‘[t]he informal clearance process should be given statutory recogni-
tion to allow those proposals which have obtained informal clearance to proceed with certainty’); Fair 
Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35 (the act should specifically recognise the informal clearance system); 
BP Australia, above n 39, 4 (the process for informal clearances should be reviewed to make them 
binding). 
148 Telstra, above n 38, 4 (a ‘hybrid approach should be adopted based on an optional formal or informal 
clearance process’ and, at 91, ‘[f]ormal clearance would be subject to a clear statutory procedure which 
set out strict time-frames and criteria for Commission decision-making. … would be confidential, at the 
option of the party seeking clearance’). 
149 The key reason for opposing the voluntary formal system was that it would reduce the ability of 
interested third parties to express their views or challenge the merger. 
2003 Dawson Report and Merger Regulation 71     
 
come.  First, increased administrative costs of the ACCC and Tribunal must be 
accommodated.  Second, there would need to be some deterrent to prevent all 
merger proponents seeking this path – if formal clearance is free, why would any-
one seek informal clearance which doesn’t provide the same level of security?150  A 
modest, but real, cost associated with the formal clearance system would help to 
ensure that it is limited to those mergers most appropriately dealt with through this 
method; that is, those cases where the merger thresholds are likely to be approached 
or exceeded, or those cases where third party intervention is likely.  Third, details 
about how long the clearance, once granted, would remain in force would need to 
be determined,151 along with a mechanism for ensuring the merger is implemented 
in the way approved by the ACCC (with no significant modifications).152
D Undertakings 
  Finally, 
the problem of how to deal with proposed mergers that raise concerns under other 
provisions of the TPA would need to be addressed. 
Unless these difficulties are overcome prior to any legislative implementation of the 
Committee’s recommendations, there is a risk that the voluntary formal process 
would become the norm for all proposed mergers.  This would have significant 
resource implications for the ACCC, beyond that predicted by the Committee. 
As indicated earlier, it was claimed in a number of submissions that section 87B 
undertakings could currently be extracted 
even though the parties involved do not consider them to be appropriate, because 
undertakings are often considered to be a more commercially realistic option than 
… authorisation …153
                                                          
150 David Inglis, ‘New Avenues for Competition Clearance’, Minter Ellison: Mergers & Acquisitions 
(May 2003) 5 (‘[w]e anticipate that the voluntary formal merger clearance process will become the 
process of choice for merging companies.  Its principal advantages are likely to be speed and certainty, 
the existence of formal statutory protection once clearance is granted, and the ability to seek a review by 
the Tribunal if the ACCC rejects the application for clearance.’) 
151 See, for example, the submission of Telstra, above n 38, 91, suggesting that ‘if granted the clearance 
would remain in force for 12 months … [d]uring this period, a statutory immunity would apply.’ 
152 The Dawson Committee indicated that the ACCC would be required to monitor compliance with any 
conditions for clearance: Dawson Report, above n 1, 70 (recommendation 2.2.1). 
153  Dawson Report, above n 1, 49.  The Committee goes on to observe that ‘[u]ndertakings may be 
inappropriate, it is said, because they go beyond the scope of competition concerns in the relevant market 
or, if relevant to the relevant market, go too far because they are not necessary for the purpose of ensur-
ing the merger does not substantially lessen competition’).  See further Shell Australia, above n 146, 6 
(‘… the Commission has used [enforceable undertakings] as a means to reconstruct an industry or 
business to conform with its vision.  In so doing, the Commission strays beyond the purpose of the 
undertakings, namely, to redress the perceived anti-competitive impact of the proposal.  This interven-
tion can have dangerous and distorting commercial implications. ...’); ABA, above n 42, 12 (‘… it is not 
always clear that the remedy, which is effectively imposed by the ACCC … is set to the minimum level 
necessary to address the competition problem identified. … use of section 87B undertakings … appears 
at times to be disproportionate to the anti-competitive detriment …’); Securities Institute of Australia, 
above n 80, 2 (‘commercial circumstances may often force merger parties to offer undertakings which 
are disproportionate to the competition problems they are intended to address’). 
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Other submissions took the view that undertakings were undesirable because inter-
ested third parties did not have sufficient input and recognition in the undertaking 
‘deal-making’ process.154  To address with this perceived problem, some called for 
strict guidelines to which the ACCC would be bound when extracting undertak-
ings,155 while others called for greater transparency for undertakings generally.156
E A new authorisation system 
 
It is certainly possible to imagine that undertakings could be extracted that were not 
necessary to ensure a proposed merger would not result in a substantial lessening of 
competition.  Given the current absence of a requirement for detailed reasons for 
extracting the undertakings, there are understandable concerns in this regard.  While 
not directly addressing the submissions relating to undertakings, the Dawson Com-
mittee’s recommendation that reasons be given in all cases where undertakings are 
extracted (whether as part of the formal or informal notification process) should go 
some way to addressing these transparency issues.   
Further, complaints that third parties do not have sufficient input are also miscon-
ceived – if undertakings addresses anti-competitive concerns (that is, they are only 
given and received for this purpose as required by the Act) then third parties should 
not be concerned.  If they believe that undertakings do not achieve this purpose and 
the proposed merger would be anti-competitive then, at least under the informal 
clearance system, third parties may take private action in relation to the merger. 
Submissions in relation to authorisation fell into two categories; those relating to 
whether authorisation should be able to be made directly to the Tribunal and those 
calling for amendments to the public benefits test. 
1 Application direct to the Tribunal 
The TPA currently permits parties to make application to the ACCC for authorisa-
tion of mergers that would otherwise substantially lessen competition where it can 
                                                          
154  Pharmacy Guild of Australia, above n 42, 2 (claims the process for accepting s 87B undertakings 
should be more transparent.  In particular, ACCC should consult with interested parties); Fair Trading 
Coalition, above n 42, iii & 30 (‘… the process for accepting s87B undertakings should be more trans-
parent, with the Commission being required to consult with all interested parties … before those under-
takings are accepted by the Courts’). 
155  Shell Australia, above n 146, 6 (‘Shell submits that the Commission should be bound to follow the 
strict guideline that, when seeking enforceable undertakings, those undertakings should only extend to 
matters which directly relate to redressing the anti-competitive effect of a proposal’); Securities Institute 
of Australia, above n 80, 2 (merger guidelines should be amended to ‘provide more guidance on the 
circumstances in which enforceable undertakings will be used’); ABA, above n 42, 2 (should expand 
Merger Guidelines ‘to provide greater guidance in relation to the circumstances in which section 87B 
undertakings will be used, to ensure they are appropriate and proportional to the actual competitive 
concerns associated with mergers.’)  
156  ANZ, above n 10, 5 (claims a weakness of the informal process is it leads to ‘deal making’ and the 
ACCC’s actions can be ‘difficult to understand and it is under no obligation to explain them’); NARGA, 
above n 51, 12 (recommends greater transparency for enforceable undertakings); Minerals Council of 
Australia, above n 80, 5 (more transparency needed). 
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be demonstrated the merger would result in such benefit to the public it should be 
allowed to take place.157  Any sufficiently interested party may appeal to the Tribu-
nal for a review of a grant (or denial) of authorisation.158
• those that recommended direct application to the Tribunal for authorisa-
tions; 
 
The key submissions in relation to direct application to the Tribunal fell into three 
categories:  
159
• those that recommended there should be an option of applying first to 
ACCC and then the Tribunal, or to the Tribunal at first instance;
 
160
• those that recommended against any option of applying to the Tribunal at 
first instance.
 and 
161
It was also argued by some that because authorisation necessarily permits mergers 
that substantially lessen competition, the process should be a difficult one – and that 
there is no real problem with the current system.
 
162
                                                          
157  See TPA ss 89(9) and 90(9). 
158  TPA s 101. 
159  Many submissions calling for direct application to the Tribunal did not indicate whether direct 
application would be optional or compulsory.  See BP Australia, above n 39, 5 (‘[t]here should be direct 
applications to the Australian Competition Tribunal for merger authorizations within strict time limits 
…’); McComas, above n 43, 13 (‘[p]rovide for direct access to the Australian Competition Tribunal for 
all authorisation applications, … [However], careful thought would have to be given to the practicality of 
this suggestion before it could be adopted’); Business Law Committee of the Law Council of Australia, 
above n 42, 2 & 56 (direct application to ACT should be available); Victorian Government, above n 30, 
13 (the suggestion of allowing parties to go straight to ACT for authorisation is worthy of consideration); 
Seven Network, above n 118, 13 (‘… the Act should be amended to allow parties to take their matters 
directly to the [Tribunal] rather than first having to go through a protracted process with the ACCC …’); 
Securities Institute of Australia, above n 80, 2 (authorisation provisions should allow merger parties to 
‘apply directly to the ACT for review’). 
160  See Shell Australia, above n 146, 5; Al Tonking, Submission to the Review of the Competition 
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 64, Trade Practices Act Review 2002, 1; 
Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 13; ABA, above n 42, 2; Allens Arthur Robinson, above n 80, 
6. 
161  ACA, above n 81, 27 (direct application to the Tribunal would ‘remove the merger proposal into a 
forum which is inaccessible to many … Bypassing the Commission, and taking a merger bid to the 
unappealable decision of the Tribunal, which has much less expertise than the Commission, is clearly a 
very attractive option to the big business [28] community. …The present ACCC process allows for 
independent research and wide community input.  It would not be a good outcome for the Australian 
economy, or a good process for the society, if wide public participation in decisions about mergers that 
substantially lessen competition were effectively denied’); Australian Business Limited, above n 43, 4 
(‘[f]or smaller and medium sized business, the issue of larger business mergers is much too important for 
it to be conducted with no opportunity for review’); Communications Law Centre, above n 43, 6 (pro-
posals that initial consideration be moved to the ACT ‘would … tend to exclude public input and would 
remove the right to appeal …’); Canberra Consumers, above n 44, 3 (moving authorisation to the 
Tribunal ‘would effectively lock out consumers, small businesses and other poorly resourced stake-
holders from the decision making process’).  See also Rhonda Smith and Timothy Grimwade, ‘Authori-
sation: Some Issues’ (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review  351, who discuss in detail the benefits 
and detriments associated with direct access to the Tribunal for authorisation. 
  It was also noted that most 
162 ACA, above n 81, 6 (‘… business is reluctant to make its arguments in public since it does not wish to 
subject itself to the public scrutiny that this process involves. … business needs to get itself into the 21st 
century, where societal requirements for transparency and public scrutiny will be increasing, not decreas-
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countries, including the United States, Canada and the European Union, have no 
mechanism whereby mergers that would otherwise contravene their laws can be 
authorised on public benefit grounds.163
However, the bulk of the submissions complained that the current authorisation 
process was too time-consuming, which made it commercially unrealistic for parties 
to time-sensitive mergers to make an application and that, therefore, it needed to be 
more efficient.
 
164  It was also argued that the fact so few authorisations have been 
made – and even less successfully – provided evidence of a failure of the current 
system – or at least evidence of a system in need of drastic reform.165  Another 
complaint was that the process was too public and, hence, commercially unattrac-
tive.166
Despite observing that public interest requires merger authorisation applications to 
be ‘thoroughly investigated’
 
167 and conceding that this will inevitably require ‘a 
public and relatively lengthy process’,168
                                                                                                                                       
ing’); Telstra, above n 38, 99; Spier Consulting, above n 42, 22; Canberra Consumers, above n 44, 4 (‘… 
business is reluctant to make its arguments in public because it does not wish to subject itself to public 
scrutiny.  This goes against societal requirements for the transparency and the process of public scrutiny 
that supports and promotes an effective marketplace and many other democratic principles’).   
163 The Committee notes that this ‘flexible’ approach of allowing mergers which do SLC to proceed 
where public benefit can be demonstrated ‘is not to be found in other jurisdictions’: Dawson Report, 
above n 1, 58.  However, note that in some jurisdictions the government, or relevant minister, has the 
power to ‘approve’ an otherwise unlawful merger (see, for example, Germany) and some other jurisdic-
tions incorporate a form of public benefit test into their substantive merger analysis. 
164  Shell Australia, above n 146, 4 (‘[i]t is … imperative that the process for authorising mergers and 
acquisitions is as efficient as it can be and that any inefficiency in the process itself does not either cause 
deals to fail or deter mergers and acquisitions from being undertaken at all. … the current authorisation 
process does contain some aspects which can result in a longer and more inefficient process than is 
necessary‘); BP Australia, above n 39, 4 (‘… the current process is marked by delays and uncertainty, 
which can be detrimental to the business involved.  … ‘); Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 10-11; 
Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 49; Business Law Committee of the Law Council of Australia, 
above n 42, 54 & 67-68 (claims the ‘clock-stopping’ mechanism in s 90(11)(a), which stops the time 
limit when ACCC requests further information, can significantly extend the time limit and claims that 
this ‘does not impose sufficient discipline on the ACCC’s consideration’ of mergers.)     
165  See for example: Shell Australia, above n 146, 4; Business Council of Australia, above n 39, 75 
(‘[t]he low number of authorisations sought for mergers provides ample illustration of the failure of the 
current process’); SFE Corporation, above n 10, 2; Business Law Committee of the Law Council of 
Australia, above n 42, 54.  
166  See Australian Industry Group, above n 29, 49-50. 
167  Dawson Report, above n 1, 66. 
168  Ibid. 
 the Committee accepted that the current 
authorisation process was commercially unrealistic, based primarily on the observa-
tion that only 5 applications for authorisation had been made in the previous 8 
years.  The key concern accepted by the Committee was in relation to the poten-
tially lengthy time-frame associated with authorisation applications.  While the 
ACCC has 30 days (45 if complex) to review a merger, this time may be extended if 
the ACCC requests more information from the applicant, or with the agreement of 
the applicant.  Of greater concern to the Committee was that even if the ACCC 
reached a decision favouring authorisation an appeal could be made by any inter-
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ested party to the Australian Competition Tribunal,169
In response to these concerns, the Committee recommended that applications for 
authorisation be made directly to the Tribunal who would have a time limit of 3 
months to determine an application.
 which would have 60 days to 
hear the matter de novo and reach a decision.  The Tribunal is also able to extend 
this time frame in certain cases. 
170  There would be no review on the merits 
from a decision of the Tribunal.171  Authorisation would thus become a ‘one-step’ 
process.172  The Committee considered that this lack of a review mechanism ‘may 
be regarded as a shortcoming’ but considered this would be off-set by the benefits 
of time saving and greater certainty of outcome which would make the process 
more commercially acceptable.173
The Committee also accepted that this proposal would have ‘significant implica-
tions’ for the Tribunal
    
174 and that Tribunal resources would need to be enhanced to 
facilitate this new role.175  They also acknowledged there would have to be a way to 
enable third parties to present their views.176  In this respect, they recommended that 
the ACCC ‘appear to assist the Tribunal’177
                                                          
169  A number of submissions complained about the low threshold for third party intervention: see Shell 
Australia, above n 146, 5 (the ‘low threshold required for a party to establish itself as a sufficiently 
interested part to appeal a Commission decision to grant an authorisation, and thereby significantly 
prolong the process, is unnecessary and should be reformed.  … the only parties who should be permitted 
to appeal against a decision of the Commission are the parties directly involved in the merger itself’); 
ANZ, above n 10, 5 (‘[a] major problem with the authorisation process is that any person that can 
establish a sufficient interest can make an application to the Australian Competition Tribunal. …’); 
Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 11 (‘… objections by third parties should be subject to disciplines 
designed to deter unsubstantiated or vexatious submissions’); Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35 
(should allow only applicant or federal minister to have standing to appeal to ACT); Spier Consulting, 
above n 42, 22 (should allow only applicant or federal minister to have standing to appeal to ACT); 
Tonking, above n 160, 1 (‘… a grant of authorisation may be set at nought by a person who has a 
“sufficient interest” and who is dissatisfied with the ACCC’s determination’); Australian Industry Group, 
above n 29, 52 (‘[c]ommercially only the parties to the merger and the regulatory authorities should have 
any say in the deliberations’); Allens Arthur Robinson, above n 80, 6 (only ‘persons with a real and 
substantial interest in an authorisation should be able to seek a review by the Tribunal’). 
170 Dawson Report, above n 1, 70 (recommendation 2.3.1). 
171 Ibid (recommendation 2.3.2).  Judicial review would be available (Dawson Report, 65). Note, in this 
respect, the difficulties of judicial review for the authorisation process, discussed in Smith & Grimwade, 
above n 161, 364-365. 
172 This is quite an extra-ordinary finding given the submissions did not even argue for it as the only 
option – but rather as an available option.  See John Schubert, ‘Trade Practices Act Now Hinders More 
Than Helps’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 10 July 2003, Supplement, 11: ‘The Dawson 
committee recommended that direct application to the tribunal occur for all authorisations, although the 
BCA argued it need only be an option available to merger proponents.’ 
173  Dawson Report, above n 1, 65. 
174  Ibid 
175  Ibid. 
176  Ibid. 
177  Ibid. 
  and that the ACCC should use re-
sources to  
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prepare and place before the Tribunal the material necessary for it to evaluate the 
application and make a decision.  In this way the quasi-judicial role of the Tribunal 
would be preserved.178
In preparing the relevant material the ACCC would be required to consult with 
interested third parties.  The Committee also recommended that the Tribunal should 
be able to ‘remit an application for consideration by the ACCC’ if it believed the 
application required a decision solely on competition issues rather than a public 
benefit assessment (on the proviso the ACCC hadn’t already considered this is-
sue).
 
179
This recommendation has, not surprisingly, been the most contentious of those 
made by the Committee in relation to mergers.  However, it has been supported by 
big business and the Government.  While authorisation may currently be a lengthy 
process – and business has complained that it is ‘commercially unrealistic’ as a 
result - it is suggested that the system was not in need of such radical reforms.  
Perhaps some less drastic change, designed to resolve time frame concerns and the 
low threshold for third party intervention, may have been more appropriate.
  
180  
Given that authorisation is a process where anti-competitive conduct is permitted, it 
is suggested that a detailed and – if need be – lengthy process, capable of review, is 
warranted.181
It is also far from clear how the ACCC will be involved.  The Committee insists 
that the ACCC must be seen to ‘help’ the Committee, but it is not clear exactly how 
this will be accomplished.  It is also not clear how parties seeking authorisation for 
conduct that may contravene both the merger provisions and other provisions of the 
Act would proceed.  This issue has arisen recently in relation to the proposed Qan-
tas/Air New Zealand alliance in which the ACCC denied authorisation.
  Commercial expediency or convenience should not prevail over the 
public interest.  If the recommendations are implemented there will be little oppor-
tunity for interested third parties to be heard and their right to challenge a merger 
that will, or may, cause them damage is eliminated.   
182
                                                          
178  Ibid 65-66. 
179  Ibid 66 (recommendation 2.3.3). 
180  See, for example, Smith and Grimwade, above 161, 365-366, who discuss other possible solutions to 
the problem of delay and cost. 
181  See further Smith and Grimwade, above n 161, 368 (‘[a]s a proposed solution to some of the prob-
lems associated with the authorisation process, direct access appears to have serious problems of its own 
.… there are serious administrative policy implications for the proposal – not the least of which is that 
direct access is founded on the idea of limiting merits review.’) 
182  This very issue has recently arisen in relation to the Qantas/Air New Zealand authorisation applica-
tion which related both to a proposed merger and anti-competitive conduct under s 45.  See ACCC, 
‘Qantas/Air New Zealand Alliance “Not in Public Interest”’ (Media Release 194/03, 9 September 2003) 
<http://203.6.251.7/accc.internet/digest/view_media.cfm?RecordID=1116>. 
   Would 
authorisation of the merger protect parties from action under other provisions within 
Part IV?  The Report does not address this issue at all.   
It is suggested that much more consideration needs to be given to the implications 
of this recommendation before such a drastic change is implemented.  
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F No more ‘public benefit factors’ to be listed 
In determining whether it is ‘satisfied in all the circumstances that the proposed 
acquisition would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to the public that the 
acquisition should be allowed to take place’,183
• a significant increase in exports; 
 the ACCC is required to pay regard 
to the possibility that the merger will enhance Australia’s ability to compete inter-
nationally.  More specifically, s 90(9A) requires the ACCC to have regard to 
whether the merger would result in: 
• ‘a significant substitution of domestic products for imported goods;’ and 
• ‘all other relevant matters that relate to the international competitiveness of any 
Australian industry’ (emphasis added). 
This list is non-exhaustive, so other public benefits may be considered and, in this 
respect, the Tribunal has held that the term ‘public benefit’ should be given ‘its 
widest possible meaning’.184
A number of submissions called for a more detailed list of public benefits and/or a 
clearer indication of what else might be considered a public benefit;
  
185 greater 
consideration of the need to compete globally as a public benefit;186 consideration of 
rural and regional issues;187 consideration of small business188 and other specific 
public benefits.189  One submission specifically opposed any change to the public 
benefit criteria.190 Another proposed that the test itself should be changed to one of 
‘no significant public detriment’.191
On the basis that the Tribunal has applied the public benefit test widely, the Com-
mittee rejected the call for additional public benefit factors, believing there would 
not be any ‘real benefit to be gained’
  
192
                                                          
183  TPA s 90(9). 
184  Dawson Report, above n 1, 58.  See also QCMA, above n 18. 
185  ExxonMobil, above n 39, 6; Spier Consulting, above n 42, 15. 
186  Commonwealth Bank, above n 28, 9 (section 90(9A)(a) should ‘require the Commission to regard as 
a benefit to the public: a significant enhancement in the ability of an Australian enterprise to compete 
more effectively with global competitors in Australia;  [and] a significant enhancement in the ability of 
an Australian enterprise to compete more effectively in global markets’).  
187  Spier Consulting, above n 42, 15; Department of Transport and Regional Services, Submission to the 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 189, Trade 
Practices Act Review 2002, 9. 
188  Spier Consulting, above n 42, 15. 
189  Spier Consulting, above n 42, 15 (should include ‘the impact of deregulation and any other structural 
adjustment on the Australian community or communities …’). 
190  Law Council of Australia (supp), above n 9, 11 (‘[t]he public benefits which arise from a proposed 
merger or acquisition will always depend heavily on the facts and circumstances of the merger in 
question … it is appropriate that the Act leaves the determination of what constitutes the public benefit to 
the ACCC or the Tribunal who have the opportunity to consider the facts surrounding the merger.’) 
191  Spier Consulting, above n 42, 22 and Fair Trading Coalition, above n 42, 35. 
192  Dawson Report, above n 1, 58.   
 from any such change.  The Committee 
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noted that any matter can be taken into consideration as a public benefit already and 
listing them risked ‘their being given undue emphasis’.193
V RESPONSE TO THE DAWSON REPORT 
 
However, if one takes the view that matters should not be listed in s 90(9A) simply 
because they may already be considered generally as a public benefit, there would 
be no justification for any matters being listed in s 90(9A).  Clearly, the govern-
ment, when introducing section 90(9A) was doing so to ensure that international 
matters were considered in every case as a public benefit – even though they were 
already capable of being considered.  As the Committee itself observed, matters 
listed in s 90(9A) currently are given greater ‘emphasis’ than other public benefits.  
Thus, the submissions calling for additional factors to be listed were claiming that 
their proposed public benefit should enjoy the same level of importance – or em-
phasis - as the existing factors.   
Further consideration should have been given to determining if it was appropriate to 
elevate other potential benefits to the same level as international factors.  This was 
especially relevant in relation to submissions for rural and regional issues to be 
included as a public benefit, given the term of reference calling for consideration to 
be given to whether the current competition provisions are responsive to the needs 
and requirements of rural and regional areas.  A broader list would also provide 
further guidance as to what will be considered public benefits in any given case, as 
the concept is clearly a subjective one.  The Committee’s cursory dealing with these 
submissions was disappointing. 
 
The Report, when released, did not entirely satisfy interested parties, but neither did 
it seem to strike any severe blows.194  Some took the view that the Dawson Commit-
tee ‘tinkered with the operation of the Trade Practices Act in a restrained and sensi-
ble way’195 and that only ‘cosmetic reforms’ had been made to the merger laws, 
while others labelled the proposed changes to merger regulation ‘convoluted and 
unpredictable’.196  Debate on the desirability or otherwise of the proposed reforms 
continues.197
                                                          
193  Ibid.   
194 John Durie, ‘A little something for everyone’, The Weekend Financial Review (Sydney), April 17-
April 21 2003, 6.  See also comment by Heather Ridout, of the Australian Industry Group: ‘… there’s 
something in it for everyone and no-one has got everything they wanted’: The Weekend Financial 
Review (Sydney), April 17-April 21 2003, 6.  It has also been suggested the Dawson Review has ‘failed 
to provide any meaningful reforms’: Amanda Gome and Jacqui Walker, ‘The unloved ones’, Business 
Review Weekly (Sydney) 8-14 May 2003, 40. 
195 Alan Kohlar, ‘A sensible tinkering with the TPA’, The Weekend Financial Review (Sydney), 17-21 
April 2003, 2. 
196 Ibid. 
 
197 The major focus of comment in relation to the Dawson Report has been on the Committee’s dealing 
with the misuse of market power prohibition (TPA, s 46), their recommendation for the introduction of 
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Perhaps not surprisingly big business appear happy about the proposed amendments 
to the authorisation process,198 allowing them to bypass the ACCC199
On the other hand, the ACCC, small business, consumer groups and some academic 
commentators appear less enamoured with the Report’s recommendations.
 and, more 
importantly, precluding third-party intervention on appeal.  They believe the new 
process will contribute to making them more internationally competitive, presuma-
bly on the basis that they would be more successful at convincing the Tribunal that 
scale is needed to achieve international competitiveness and that this would be in 
the public interest.  The Government apparently shares their enthusiasm for reform. 
 
200
The Government responded favourably to the Dawson Report as a whole and, in 
relation to mergers, supported all recommendations.
   
A Government Response  
201
• supported the recommendation that the ACCC provide reasons for its 
informal clearance decisions ‘when requested by the applicants and in 
cases where it has rejected a merger or accepted undertakings’,
  In particular the Govern-
ment: 
202
• agreed that a voluntary formal clearance process that operated in par-
allel with the existing informal clearance sprocess hould be estab-
lished in accordance with the Committee’s recommendation; and 
 ac-
cepting that this would promote a better understanding of the ACCC’s 
decisions and would reduce current uncertainty; 
• agreed that authorisation applications should be made directly to the 
Tribunal which would be required to consider third party interests. 
The Government has not released any formal plans for legislative change since their 
initial response.   
                                                                                                                                       
criminal sanctions for hard core cartels and their recommendations in relation to the ACCC’s dealings 
with the media.  Relatively little has been written on the merger provisions. 
198 Richard Salmons, ‘Big Business Welcomes Plan to Streamline Mergers’, The Age (Melbourne), 17 
April 2003, 2. 
199 Allens Arthur Robinson, ‘Striking the right balance: business will welcome the Dawson Report’ 
(Press Release, 16 April 2003) <http://www.aar.com.au/med/pressreleases/pr3apr03.htm> (‘[The 
Dawson Report] will be warmly welcomed by most sections of the business community …’). 
200 Henry Ergas, for example, has expressed concerns about the suggested amendments to the authorisa-
tion process.  His concern focuses on how applications involving more than merely s 50 issues Ergas 
would be handled. He also questions the merit of providing the Tribunal with an inquisitorial role – 
practically and in terms of maintaining its independence: Ergas, ‘Doubts about Dawson’, above n 108  
and Ergas, ‘Good Report, Pity About All the Flaws’, above n 108, 63. 
201 Commonwealth Government Response to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act, 15 April 2003,  
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/publicatons/TPAResponse.asp>. 
202 Ibid. 
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B ACCC Response 
The ACCC issued a preliminary response via press release on 16 April 2003.203   No 
more detailed response has been issued.  In relation to mergers, while generally 
welcoming the decision not to recommend amendment to the substantive test, the 
ACCC raised concerns about the proposed optional formal clearance system and the 
recommendation that authorisations proceed directly to the Australian Competition 
Tribunal.  In relation to the former the ACCC was concerned at the complexities 
involved when a proposal involves more issues than simply a merger analysis.  In 
relation to the latter the ACCC was concerned about ‘what role, if any, there would 
be for public or small business participation in public interest determinations under 
this proposal’,204 noting that the Tribunal ‘is a poor venue for consumers and small 
businesses to use’205 and is not as open and transparent as the current ACCC process 
‘which facilitates participation … by all interested parties’.206  The ACCC also 
expressed concern that implementation of this recommendation would ‘eliminate 
the opportunity for merits review’,207 affecting the rights of parties affected by a 
proposed merger’.208
‘[the] obvious severe mechanical difficulties … concerning the role which 
the Commission would play, given that the Tribunal is not an investigative 
body’.
 
In a less formal setting, speaking to the National Press Club, Prof Allan Fels, on his 
last day as Chairman of the ACCC, expressed further concern in relation to the 
proposed authorisation process, about  
209
Fels also noted, again, that the Tribunal has, to date, ‘been an unfriendly forum for 
consumer and small business.’
 
210  In relation to the lack of an appeal mechanism he 
re-iterated that the authorisation process is one that most other jurisdictions don’t 
have and, because it provides the possibility of permitting monopoly, it should 
contain stringent safeguards.  The lack of appeal for such a powerful mechanism is 
not ‘desirable’.  ‘A few lax decisions’, Fels claims, ‘and the level of concentration 
in the economy will sharply increase.’211
                                                          
203 ACCC, ‘Dawson Report – Preliminary Response: Criminal Sanctions Major Step Forward for 
Competition Policy’ (Media Release 74/03, 16 April 2003). 
204  ACCC, ‘Dawson Report – Preliminary Response’, above n 203. 
205  Ibid. 
206  Ibid. 
207  Ibid. 
208  Ibid. 
209 Allan Fels, ‘Competition Policy: A Report Card for the last 12 years and an Agenda for the Future’ 
(Speech delivered to the National Press Club, 30 June 2003) 7. 
210  Ibid. 
211  Ibid 8.  See also Allan Fels, ‘A Small Business Friendly Trade Practices Act’ (Speech to the Council 
of Small Business Organisations of Australia – National Small Business Summit Agenda, Canberra, 18 
June 2003) and comments by Fels extracted in Amanda Gome, ‘Small-business defenders’, Business 
Review Weekly (Sydney), 8-14 May 2003, 42 (‘[w]e are quite concerned about direct access to the 
Australian Competition Tribunal for merger authorisation … the tribunal is not a friendly place for small 
business … Also, there is no right of appeal …’). 
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More recently, the new Chairman of the ACCC, Graeme Samuel, has announced 
that the Commission will implement the recommendation to publish reasons for a 
decision made as part of the informal clearance process where the merger has been 
rejected, approved with undertakings or where parties have sought such disclo-
sure.212  Other recommendations regarding merger processes have received a cool 
reception from the new Chairman.  In particular, Samuel has expressed concern 
about the Dawson Committee’s proposed formal notification system.  Samuel’s 
concerns are twofold.  First, that the system as proposed may effectively mean the 
end of the informal system in Australia and its associated benefits.213  Second, 
Samuel is concerned that restrictive time frames for providing decisions under the 
formal process will result in more merger rejections than is currently the case.214  In 
relation to authorisations, Samuel has also expressed concern that there will be 
reduced opportunity for parties to engage in an ‘interactive process’ with the Com-
mission because of ‘the Commission’s envisaged role in assisting the Tribunal’ 
which would render such discussion inappropriate.215
VI CHALLENGES FACING IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Implementing legislation was predicted for late 2003/early 2004, but this may be 
hindered by the pressure the Government has been subjected to in relation to the 
proposed changes.  It has been claimed that  
some government backbenchers say they will oppose a key proposal in the Dawson 
report to allow businesses to bypass the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission and go straight to the Competition Tribunal for approval of anti-
competitive mergers.216
At present, however, it appears the greatest challenge to the implementation of the 
reform comes from the big winners – big business.  The Business Council of Aus-
tralia has threatened to withdraw support for the entire Dawson Report if the gov-
  
and the proposal is unlikely to receive bipartisan support.   
                                                          
212 ACCC, ‘ACCC to Publish Reasons for its Merger Decisions’ (Media Release 238/03, 12 November 
2003).  See also Graeme Samuel, ‘Balancing the Competing Pressures’ (Speech to the National Press 
Club, Canberra, 12 November 2003).  Since announcing this new policy two applications for informal 
clearance have been rejected.  Reasons for the first were made available on the ACCC website in 
December 2003: see ACCC, ‘ACCC assessment of Coca-Cola Amital Limited’s proposed acquisition of 
Berrie Limited’ (2003). 
213 Samuel, ‘Balancing the Competing Pressures’, above n 212, 8-9. 
214 Ibid 10. 
215 Ibid 9. 
216 Toni O’loughlin, ‘Dawson Plan Facing Resistance’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 23 April 
2003, 4. 
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ernment considers making amendments to s 46.217  The Dawson Committee recom-
mended against changes to s 46, relating to the misuse of market power, but re-
cently a Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into the Effectiveness of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 in protecting small business has been established at 
the behest of small business.  Big business, it appears, would rather sacrifice all 
gains achieved in relation to mergers than risk having the government implement a 
stricter version of the misuse of market power provision.218
A further area of uncertainty with existing merger law and the implementation of 
any reforms, stems form the appointment of a new Chairman to the ACCC, Graeme 
Samuel.
 
219  Part of the controversy surrounding Samuel’s appointment - in addition 
to the procedural problems220  - has stemmed from his business background; the fear 
being that he will be softer on big business than his pre-decessar.221  Samuel made 
some of his views about competition policy clear in an article in Business Review 
Weekly.222  While speaking out in favour of vigorous competition (noting that with-
out our vigorous competition policy Australia ‘would not have weathered the inter-
national economic storm in such good shape’),223 he gave little away about how 
mergers would be considered, noting only that very few are opposed by the ACCC.  
It remains to be seen how his views – whatever they may be - on the competitive 
effects of mergers will influence merger assessment, including the assessment of 
authorisation applications.  However, the ACCC’s recent rejection of the first 
application for merger authorisation since Samuel’s appointment 224 at least indicates 
the Commission is not going to become too soft in its dealings with big business.  It 
may even provide evidence of Samuel’s claim that ‘poachers make the best game-
keepers.’225
 
   
                                                          
217 Ron Boswell, ‘Safeway Decision not be-all-and-end-all on s 46 Effectiveness’ (Press Release 
B74/2003, 8 July 2003) (‘[t]he Business Council of Australia has made it clear that they believe the 
outcome of any further TPA reform would be unfavourable for the companies they represent, even to the 
extent that they have said they may withdraw support for all of the changes proposed by Dawson, if 
Section 46 is re-examined’); Christine Wallace, ‘Big end of town: axe reforms’, The Australian (Syd-
ney), 20 June 2003, 19 (finance); Peter Switzer, ‘Time for Howard to tell those bleating bigwigs to butt 
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VII CONCLUSION 
The Dawson Committee’s discussion of mergers was far from adequate.  The 
Committee’s retention of the substantial lessening of competition test and its rec-
ommendations relating to the ACCC’s clearance processes were generally good.  
On the other hand, the Committee’s recommendations in relation to the authorisa-
tion procedure, it’s dismissal of numerous other legitimate submissions, with very 
little by way of explanation, and it’s failure to even acknowledge other important 
submissions, such as those relating to the international competitiveness of Austra-
lian business, were inadequate for a review of this nature, especially when consider-
ing the terms of reference with which the Committee was armed.  Even for those 
recommendations the Committee did make, they did not address a number of vital 
procedural matters which might affect their implementation.  This Review provided 
an important opportunity to thoroughly assess the state of merger regulation in 
Australian.  Unfortunately, the final report – comprising less than 14 pages of 
analysis on the various contentious aspects of merger regulation in Australia, con-
stituted a failure by the Committee to take advantage of this unique opportunity. 
 
 
